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DESERT AND DETERRENCE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE MORAL BASES OF
THE CASE FOR CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
• Richard 0. Lempert *

The controversy over the death penalty has generated arguments
of two types. The first argument appeals to moral intuitions; the second concerns deterrence. Although both types of argument speak to
the morality of systems of capital punishment, the first debate has
been dominated by moral philosophers and the second by empirical
social scientists. For convenience I shall at times refer to the approach of the moral philosophers as the moral case for (or against)
capital punishment or as the argument from morality.
Those who make out a moral case for the death penalty argue in
a variety of ways that those who kill others deserve to die. 1 Indeed,
to some it is our willingness to execute the murderer which affirms
the high value that all participants in the debate place on human
life.2 This is the essence of what is usually called the retributivist
position. The moral argument against the death penalty starts with
the principle that it is wrong intentionally to take human life. For
those who regard this principle as an absolute, the fact that it is
wrong to kill does not make it right to take the murderer's life. Opponents of the death penalty correctly point out that in an era when
the "eye for an eye" approach to punishment has been abandoned
for almost every crime, no self-evident principle demands that it be
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1964, Oberlin College; J.D. 1968, Ph.D.
1971, University of Michigan. - Ed.
A number of people have read this manuscript in draft and have ottered valuable comments. I would like to thank Cynthia Lempert, Colin Loftin, Dan Rubinfeld and Frank Zimring. I am also grateful to Jerold Israel, Joe Sax and Philip Soper, whose disagreement with
some of the arguments in the draft manuscript forced me to think further about some difficult
issues. An earlier version of this paper was part of a longer paper presented at the Chief
Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers
Foundation and published privately by the Foundation as part of the Conference Proceedings.
l. See, e.g., W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1979); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS (1975); Gerstein, Capitol Punishment - "Cruel and Unusual"? A Retributivist Response, 85 ETHICS 75 (1974); van den Haag, In Defense ofthe JJeath Penalty: A Legal-PoliticolMorol Analysis, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (1978); Vellenga, Christianity and the JJeath Penalty, in
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 123 (H. Bedau ed. 1967); Weiler, Why JJo We Punish? The.
Cose for Retributive Justice, 12 U. BRIT. CoLUM. L. REv. 295 (1978).
2. See, e.g., W. BERNS, supra note I; Weiler, supra note l.
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retained for homicide.3 They also make the more debatable argument that the state's action in taking a life degrades the values it
allegedly asserts.
Both sides of the argument from morality are concerned with issues of justice.4 No principle of retribution allows the taking of an
innocent life. Nor does the just desert theory allow personal characteristics such as sex, race, or national status to dominate indicia of
moral culpability in determining punishment.5 Retributivists justify
the death penalty despite substantial evidence that it has been inequitably applied by arguing that inequitable application is not inherent in the penalty, and that it is better that some receive their just
3. See, e.g., Gibbs, Preventive Effects
CRIM. L. BULL. 34 {1978).

of Capital Punishment

Other than .Deterrence, 14

4. Compare Black, Reflections on Opposing the Penalty of .Death, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1
(1978), and C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
(1974), with Gerstein, supra note 1.

5. To my knowledge no modem retributivist has argued that unalterable personal characteristics such as race and sex may be properly considered in assessing culpability for crime.
However, we must recognize that when people are sentenced such factors may affect moral
judgments. The reason that the vast majority of those executed for rape have been black men
in Southern and border states accused of raping white women, see Wolfgang & Redel, Rape,
Racial .Discrimination and the .Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
99 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976), is probably that the dominant majority in the executing
states regarded such interracial rape (but not its converse) as especially immoral. Similar racial bias exists in the punishment of homicide. Thirty years ago, Garfinkel collected data on
homicide indictments in ten North Carolina counties for the years 1930 through 1940. Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 Soc. FORCES 369 (1949). The data
indicated that a black indicted for killing a white had a 29% chance of receiving a death sentence. A white indicted for killing a white had a 7% probability of being sentenced to death. A
black indicted for killing a black had a 3% probability of receiving the death sentence, and
whites indicted for killing blacks never received the ultimate punishment. These figures suggest two kinds of racial bias, harsher penalties are exacted when killers are black regardless of
the victim's race and when victims are white regardless of the killer's race. There is also an
interaction effect such that black killers of white victims are particularly likely to receive the
death sentence.
Statutes passed after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), have not eliminated these
racial biases in sentencing. Bowers and Pierce replicated Garfinkel's basic pattern of bias for
post-Furman executions (through 1977) in Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio, which collectively accounted for about 70% of the nation's death sentences in the five years after Furman.
Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and .Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 563 (1980). In Florida, for example, blacks who killed whites were
more than five times as likely to get the death sentence as whites who killed whites, and white
people who killed whites were more than forty times as likely to get the death sentence as
whites who killed blacks. Both patterns of bias persist, although to a lesser degree, when
murders accompanied by other felony circumstances (and thus likely to be between strangers)
are distinguished from other homicides.
Bowers and Pierce also present data that suggest that a considerable amount of caprice is
part of the death sentencing process. In Florida and Georgia, for example, the probability of a
death sentence is significantly related to the region in which the homicide is tried, id. at 616-25,
and the likelihood that particular aggravating circumstances will be found appears to depend
more on the aggravation necessary to justify a death sentence than on the facts of each case, id.
at 625-29. For an estimation of the degree of arbitrariness in death sentencing under California's pre-Furman statute, see Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Ident!f.ying Comparatively
Excessive Sentences of .Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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deserts, however biased the sample executed, than, that none do. 6
For some opponents of capital punishment the inconsistency with
which it is applied is enough to condemn it.7 These opponents need
not confront the question of whether it is ultimately just to execute
the murderer, for regardless of ultimate deserts, extreme penalties
cannot be allowed so long as aspects of personal disadvantage play
an important part in determining who from among an equally culpable lot will be subject to the extreme sanction.
The argument concerning deterrence is of a different kind. If executions deter, it means that killing some who have behaved heinously will prevent the untimely death of blameless others. Indeed,
those who support capital punishment because of its deterrent effects
expect that one execution will save several lives, thus avoiding the
nice philosophical question of whether an innocent life is worth
more than a guilty one. Many opponents of the death penalty implicitly concede that capital punishment is morally permissible if it
saves more lives than it takes. 8 The argument is over the empirical
question of whether the death penalty actually deters and, if so, in
what circumstances and to what extent.
There is no necessary connection between moral positions on the
justice of capital punishment and empirical judgments as to whether
executions deter, but, not surprisingly, moral opponents find comfort
in evidence that executions do not deter while moral supporters are
heartened by those studies that suggest they do. It is difficult for
those whose essential case against the death penalty rests on the
value of life to maintain their positions if an execution in fact trades
one guilty life for several innocent ones. 9 Even the argument from
equality is clouded if the execution of each killer, however inequitably each is selected from among a larger number, prevents the death
of several innocent people. Since the same features of social class
which make one peculiarly eligible for capital punishment make one
disproportionately likely to be a homicide victim, there may even be
6. van den Haag, supra note 1, 14 CRIM. L.

BULL.

at 53-56.

7. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 4. This view also influenced several of the concurring
Justices in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8. One wonders if the concession would be forthcoming if the opponents were not convinced that the evidence shows capital punishment does not deter.
9. For an intriguing argument that this trade-off does not justify capital punishment as a
matter of human values because the life to be lost is known and the lives to be saved unknown,
see McKee & Sesnowitz, We!fare Economics Aspects of Capital Punishment, 35 AM. J. EcoN. &
Soc. 40 (1976). See also Donnelly,A Theory ofJustice, Judicial Methodology, and the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment: Rawls, .Dworkin, and a Theory of Criminal Responsibility, 29
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1109, 1145-52 (1978).

1180

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:1177

a kind of rough justice within classes if executions deter. 10
Although retributivists trace their heritage to Kant and before
him to the Bible, utilitarianism is pervasive enough in modem
thought that most retributivists would be troubled if a plausible case
could not be made for deterrence. Death by execution is both brutal
and :final. 11 It is hard to make the case for such a penalty when the
only end promoted is the unprovable intuition that it is just. 12 Nevertheless, modem retributivists have been less concerned than their
opponents with the evidence bearing on deterrence. This may in
part be because until recently there was virtually no empirical evidence that gave them comfort. Indeed, a desire to justify capital
punishment on grounds other than deterrence has probably contributed to the revival of retributivist theories of punishment. The retributivist justification is possible - although nondeterrence be
proven - because justice, however intuitive its grounding, is itself a
valued end. Thus, the argument from justice does not necessarily
take us beyond the question of whether an offender deserves execution. The opposing moral claim, from the value of life, pulls us almost irresistibly to the question of whether taking an offender's life
will be compensated by the preservation of lives that would otherwise be lost to murder - the empirical question addressed by the
research on deterrence.
IO. This conclusion assumes a general deterrent effect not closely tied to the characteristics
of those crimes that result in executions. When a lower-class offender is executed for killing an
upper-class victim, members of the lower class may receive few benefits from deterrence if the
message conveyed is not "it is wrong to kill," but is instead "it is wrong to kill above your
class."
11. Descriptions of executions bring home the point. Camus' well-known Reflections on the
Guillotine, in REsISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 173, 182-85 (J. O'Brien trans. 1961), captures both the horror and the brutality of the event. But even ordinary descriptions ofordinary
executions convey a special sense of horror. West, for example, describing how he came to
oppose capital punishment, writes:
In one hour on August 4, 1952, at the Fort Madison, Iowa, State Penitentiary, I learned
that a chronic schizophrenic man can be found legally sane and thus qualify for hangini;
that those who came to watch are likely to have a strange and an unhealthy glitter in their
eyes; that a man hits the end of a rope with a terrible crack; that he doesn't just dangle but
is likely to writhe for some time; and that the heart stops reluctantly, as the doctors must
discover, listening with stethoscopes all the while. As I listened (for an interminable 13
minutes) to the dying heart of Edward J. Beckwith, there was time for me to ask myself a
host of troublesome questions about what we had done that morning.
West, Psychiatric Reflections on the .Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PuNISHMENT lN THE UNITED
.STATES, supra note 5, at 419,420.
12. Indeed, one often encounters the idea that executions should be made as painless and
as dignified as possible. Lehtinen, for example, suggests that the executed be administered a
lethal dose of a sedative in a hospital and his organs made available for transplant. Lehtinen,
The Value ofLffe: An Argument far the .Death Penalty, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 237, 246
(1977).
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PROBLEMS WITH RETRIBUTIVISM

A. Inferring Policy from Philosophy

Despite my willingness to concede for the sake of argument that
justice - by which I mean giving a person his just deserts - may be
a value superior to life, I believe that the retributivist attempt to escape the deterrence question is inadequate, and that ultimately the
moral decision on the death penalty must reflect an empirical assessment. The most powerful retributivist arguments for the death penalty fail as a moral justification for capital punishment because they
do not address the crucial question. Retributivists have let their
agenda be set by those who defend life as an ultimate value. Thus,
they direct most of their attention to the question of whether murderers deserve to die. While an affirmative answer to this question is
necessary to justify capital punishment, it is not sufficient. There remains the rather different question of whether the state should be
allowed to execute murderers.
A state-run system of executions poses problems for retributivists
which are not posed by the mere taking of guilty lives. We can perhaps best appreciate this at an intuitive level. It is easy to imagine a
person who is not troubled by news that an escaping murderer has
been shot and yet quite disturbed by the news that a murderer is
about to be executed. In Chicago, for example, between the years
1934 and 1954 eight times as many criminals were killed by police or
private individuals as were executed in the Cook County Jail. 13 The
executions, no doubt, caused far more controversy and grief than did
the other killings, even though many of the latter must have involved
crimes for which the death penalty could not have been given. In
part this is because the scheduling of executions allows those who
value even guilty lives to become involved in efforts to save them,
but this cannot be the whole story. If lives were the only issue, more
effort would be directed toward preventing police and shop owners
from shooting fleeing felons than toward the abolition of capital
punishment. Another reason why state executions excite feelings
that are not excited when the sole issue is whether a slain murderer
has received his just deserts is that our doubts about the justness of
the desert we mete out increase when the state does the killing. We
can explain the deadly reaction of a store owner or police officer to a
perceived threat as a normal human response to pressure, but because the state has time for considered action, we hold it to special
standards of rationality.
13.

T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY

62 (1959).
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Once we acknowledge that not everyone who kills another
should die - and virtually all modem retributivists acknowledge
this - doubts about the fairness of the process by which we select
those we execute arise. I have already mentioned the difficulties
some see in justifying executions when the poor or the black are
over-selected for the ultimate punishment, but even less invidious
inconsistencies must trouble the retributivist. For absent some selfevident principle separating murderers who deserve to die from
those who do not, a principled basis for retributivism may only be
determined inductively. If inconsistent sentencing prevents the derivation of a socially validated principle, the person who applauds the
execution of the murderer is applauding what is literally unprincipled state action. While unprincipled state action may be more common than most of us would like, we usually try to avoid theories
which, when applied, lead us to applaud it.
If there is solace for the retributivist, it is in his sense that the
state's lack of principle leads it to spare life rather than to take it.
People who deserve to die but are spared death can hardly prick
one's conscience. While this view may satisfy some moralists who
would otherwise have qualms about espousing an inevitably capricious system of capital punishment, it offers nothing to the skeptic.
When one criminal is executed and another of apparently equal culpability spared, there is no self-evident reason why the sparing and
not the execution is wrong. When a state cannot act consistently in
such an important matter as determining who shall die, those who
invoke moral philosophy to demand that the state be allowed to
make that determination should be able to point to a consensually
validated principle which assures us that the inconsistency is benign.14
Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of the innocent
which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed. It is true that
documented cases in which the wrong person is executed are quite
rare, 15 and likely to remain so. But, as a purely philosophical matter,
this is of little help to the retributivist. Retributivism, on its own
terms, allows life to be taken only when death is deserved; it does not
tolerate killing as a means to some greater social good. Retribu14. Retributivists can escape the dilemma, and some do, by claiming that their purpose is
limited to determining the characteristics of a just system of punishment in a just world. However, if the limitation is meant seriously, we know from the research of economists on the
theory of the second best that a system which maximizes justice in an ideal world is not
necessarily the most just system in an imperfect society.
15. See, e.g., Pollak, The Ellors of Justice, in CAPITAL PuN1sHMENT 207 (T. Sellin ed.
1967).
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tivists are proud of their Kantian heritage, which demands that life
be treated only as an end. Thus, however good a just punishment
system and however much such a system demands the death penalty,
the philosophy of retributivism apparently forbids the sacrifice of innocent lives as a condition for the maintenance of such a system.
Ideally, of course, a system of capital punishment would not take
innocent lives, but we know as a statistical matter that if a state executes often enough, some innocent lives will be lost. Although it
may be a comfort not knowing what lives will be mistakenly taken,
nothing about retributivism allows us to sacrifice the lives of unknown innocents in the interest of just vengeance. 16
As I have noted, few modern retributivists believe that all killers
deserve death. They respect the law's determination that capital
punishment should be reserved for the most morally culpable: those
who fully intended, and perhaps rejoiced in, the suffering and death
they inflicted and who, in some meaningful sense, could have done
otherwise. Moral culpability, thus conceived, is a subjective state.
To truly determine who are the most evil and thus the most deserving of death one would have to search people's minds. Our inability
to do so means that in deciding whether to inflict the death penalty
we often attend more to the circumstances of the crime than to the
circumstances of the criminal. The person who slays in a peculiar or
brutal way is more likely to receive the death penalty than one who
dispatches his victim with a single bullet, yet the former may have
been insane under all but the narrowest legal test while the latter was
cool and calculating.
Indeed, the former may have been insane even under any legal
test. While the mistaken conviction of those who have not,killed is
certainly rare, the mistaken allocation of responsibility to those who
16. Absent the death penalty there would still be substantial retributivism and thus justice
in the form of sentences to life imprisonment. A number of innocent people will necessarily
receive such sentences since mistakes are an inevitable part of any punishment system. The
marginal loss of retributively defined justice in the case of the guilty will be the difference
between the retributivism inherent in the life sentence and that inherent in an execution, but
the marginal gain in justice accorded the innocent will be greater. A number of the innocent
will prove their blamelessness after conviction, be released early from prison, and in all
probability be compensated to some extent for the time they have served. Note that the presence of the death penalty may also contribute to the unjustified infliction of less than death
sentences on the innocent. A guilty plea by an innocent accused may be more likely in a death
penalty jurisdiction than in a jurisdiction where one does not risk death by asserting his innocence, and a jury qualified to impose the death penalty may be more likely mistakenly to
convict of a less than capital offense than one which has not been so qualified. Haney, Juries
and the .Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
512 (1980); Jurow, New .Data on the Effect oJa ".Death Qua/flied" Jury on the Guilt .Determination Process, 84 HAR.v. L. REv. 567 (1971). For an extended discussion of the relevance of the
fact that we do not know who is being executed wrongfully, see the appendix to this Article.
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have killed may be uncomfortably common. To the retributivist one
mistake is almost as bad as another, for in most retributivist schemes
the unpremeditated murderer or the insane killer no more deserves
to die than the innocent victim of a misidentification. 17 In arguing
from a retributivist philosophy to an actual system of state executions, retributivists are again advocating a system that will work substantial injustice as measured by the standards of the philosophical
system they espouse.
The time lag between the time of the crime and the time of execution also poses problems for retributivism. Executions are justified
only when the offender deserves to die. Assuming that all those sentenced to death deserved to die at the time they committed the
crimes for which they were sentenced, it does not follow that they
deserve death at the time it arrives. People so change with their experiences that one may sensibly conceive of individuals as different
people deserving different fates at different points in time. 18 Being
on death row may be an experience that is especially likely to promote such a change in moral identity. 19
In short, there is a fundamental irony to the usual retributivist
position. Basic principles of moral justice that are believed to justify
or even demand the death of those who maliciously kill others are
necessarily offended by the attempt to impose a system of state executions in an imperfect world. The emphasis that retributivists
place on human beings as ends and not as means, the high value
they place on innocent human life, and their insistence that retributivism (unlike revenge) respects the bounds oflaw combine to form a
philosophy from which one cannot derive a policy that trades the
wrongful execution of a few for the proper execution of many. 20
Capital punishment implements such a policy. Conversely, any policy derived from a philosophy that is rooted in our intuitions regarding justice will be suspect if the system it prescribes distributes
17. Obviously one could construct a retributivist scheme in which all but accidental death
was regarded as sufficiently heinous to merit capital punishment. Most retributivists have not
done so, believing that the death sentence should be reserved for killings that the law classifies
as first degree murder or for a particularly offensive subset of such killings.
18. A similar point has been made by Donald Regan in an article seeking justifications for
paternalism. Regan, Just!ftcationsfor Paternalism, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 189 (NOMOS XV,
J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1974).
19. For an example, see Bailey, Rehabilitation on .Death Row, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA, supra note 1.
20. Judging by the reactions of those who have read this Article in draft, this is the most
controversial statement in this section of the paper. For those who do not accept my conclusion or are otherwise interested in the philosophic questions it raises, I offer a detailed analysis
of this question. For those who agree with me or are not interested in pursuing the matter in
detail, I offer it in an appendix.
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rewards or punishments in an invidious or inconsistent fashion.
Capital punishment is such a system.

B. Implications of The Wish for Revenge
The preceding discussion focuses on the logic of deriving a system of capital punishment from the premises of retributivism. As
such, it speaks to the scholarly debate but does not address the more
primitive appeal of retributivism. When one person wantonly kills
another we are - if our senses have not been jaded by murder after
murder - outraged. Retribution in the form of killing the offender
seems like an honorable thing to do.
Why do we feel there is honor in repaying death with death? I
believe the reasons are largely cultural. Once we understand them
we will see how it is possible - injustices aside - to be attracted by
retributlvism while simultaneously opposing capital punishment.
Both our history and fiction are replete with characters and communities that are thought to have acted admirably in securing the
death of grievous offenders. But it is not the fact of vengeful killing
that we admire. Rather, it is the process by which retribution is
achieved. We honor individuals not because they redress some cosmic balance sheet, but because they risk their lives for an idea of
justice. The Arthurian epic nicely highlights the way in which the
degree of honor depends on the element of personal risk. The legend
is also interesting for its message that the honor sought by the avenging champion is secondary to that which may be found in search of
the holy.
In the case of communities the infliction of death has, historically, a different meaning. The pursuit and execution of criminals
were cooperative endeavors that brought communities together to reaffirm their central values.21 It is not the fact that a death was repaid
with a death which is salutary; rather, it is the process necessary to
bring this about. Just as the linkage of a positive reinforcer with a
neutral stimulus will give the stimulus a positive quality, so do the
efforts associated with past accounts of retribution give retributivism
its lingering good name. 22 But once the state assumes the burden of
executing, the character of the retributive process is fundamentally
21. Obviously, this is not always the case, and we do not find communal retribution particularly admirable when it is not. See K. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PuRITANS (1966).
22. For a long while many people thought that retributivism's name was all bad. However,
the response to the efforts of the modem retributivists make it clear that, as a society, even the
intellectuals among us acknowledge a positive side to retributivism. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (noting various writers' acceptance of retributivism).
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changed. There is no honor in watching the state execute one who in
the past would have been a just target of the watcher's vengeance,
nor does honor attach to the person who sets a noose or straps a
convict into a chair. The meaning of executions has also changed
considerably for communities. Specialized law enforcement means
that citizens no longer have to come together to secure retribution,
and the execution itself has become a source of passionate controversy rather than the occasion for a reassertion of communal solidarity.
In his book For Capital Punishment, Walter Berns uses the example of Shakespeare's Macbeth to make a strong intuitive case that
some people's crimes are such that they must die. 23 One may agree
with Berns that there is justice, both poetic and otherwise, in Macbeth's paying with his life for his crimes. But Berns's desired conclusion, that a system of state executions is appropriate and satisfying,
does not follow.
Consider an alternative ending to Shakespeare's play. Macduff,
instead of taking the field against Macbeth, calls the police to report
Macbeth's murders. Macbeth is arrested and tried. He rejects a plea
bargain that would have spared his life, and the case proceeds to
trial. During the course of the lengthy trial the mass of people who
hated Macbeth for his action begin to understand the character that
led him to so act. He is no longer just the killer of Duncan and
others, but is again, in almost impossible juxtaposition, one of Scotland's noblest Lords, himself deserving to be king. The people learn
of Macbeth's instinctive revulsion at the idea of turning on his guest
and king, they hear of Lady Macbeth's constant prodding, and they
realize that Macbeth's will was inexplicably overborne. Finally, they
sense that Macbeth's remorse is genuine and that he fully accepts the
values his actions threatened. Nevertheless, the jury convicts and the
judge, who is up for reelection that year, sentences Macbeth to die.
A Gallup poll indicates that 44% of the people surveyed believe the
sentence is just, 39% believe Macbeth should be spared, and 17%
have no opinion. Immediately a committee to save Macbeth is
formed. The next two years are taken up with judicial appeals often on technical matters that have no relation to the core moral
issues - and with pleas for executive clemency. From time to time a
story appears in the paper emphasizing that whatever Macbeth was,
he is today a decent man. Eventually the last appeal is dismissed
and the king, after dropping hints that he might spare Macbeth, de23. W. BERNS, supra note I, at 167.
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cides it would be politically inexpedient to do so. On a cold November morning, with fifty members of the Spare Macbeth Committee
marching outside the prison walls in protest, a warden, a minister, a
doctor, an executioner, and two reporters watch Macbeth dangle on
the end of a rope for twenty-five minutes until he chokes to death.
The reporters note in the evening papers that ''the drop was not handled well," but they do not mention the urination and defecation
that took place while Macbeth was dangling. Television news uses
the occasion to review the story of the assassination and to interview
tearful members of Macbeth's family who, in their grief, accuse the
state of murder.24
Our satisfaction with Macduff's slaying of Macbeth, which Berns
plays on so effectively, reflects not the fact of retribution but the way
it was accomplished. Had an impersonal, divisive, state-controlled
execution like that described above been the only way of dispatching
Macbeth, the play, no doubt, would not have been written. Yet in
contemporary society, with the importance we attach to personal
freedom, trial justice, and the safeguarding of the innocent, this is
the only way that the state may act retributively. There is nothing
noble about it. As with the basic philosophical argument, the existence, and to that extent the self-evident validity, of the retributivist
intuition that certain killers ought to be repaid with death tells us
only that there is some good in killing evildoers. However, if we
understand the intuition's cultural roots, we see that it does not follow that there ought to be a state system of capital punishment. The
retributivist instinctively applauds Macduff because he bravely
killed a man who deserved to die. 25 State executions not only destroy our consensus as to what fate is deserved, but they also eliminate the possibility of honor. Our instinct for revenge - and that is
what the retributivist intuition is at base - was shaped by and is
meant for a different world.

II.

THE DETERRENCE .ARGUMENT

The argument from deterrence does not share the deficiencies of
the retributivist position. Its central premise - that executing murderers will save more lives than are taken - provides a reasonable
24. An alternative scenario would have Macbeth denying hili complicity in the crime and
blaming it all on the guards. While there might be enough evidence to convict Macbeth, we
could never know as much as Shakespeare tells us. To this day people would be writing books
protesting Macbeth's innocence. Many might believe them, and no one could know for sure
that they were wrong.
25. The criminal law does not, however, applaud such action. Macduff would today be
guilty of premeditated murder, and in some jurisdictions could be sentenced to death.
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moral basis for a system of state executions. 26 The inevitable biased,
mistaken, or inconsistent applications of the death penalty that make
retributivism a philosophy fit only for an ideal world pose no special
problems for the argument from deterrence. Such mistakes, although regrettable, do not contradict the basic premises of the argument. So long as the system of capital punishment saves more lives
than are lost there is virtue in maintaining the system.
Indeed, the argument from deterrence can justify the execution
of the innocent, for even a mistaken execution might prevent more
than one murder. 27 This possibility has been taken by some as a
ground for denying deterrence any place in the moral debate on capital punishment. But to so reject deterrence misses the crucial point,
which is that deterrence as a moral justification for capital punishment is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The virtue of the net
saving of human life that deterrence promises may be outweighed by
the injustice of inconsistent or error-prone systems of capital punishment. 28
If the moral case for capital punishment turns for many people
on its deterrent effects, it is because for those people the injustices
inherent in a system of capital punishment are tolerable if state executions generate a net saving of human life.29 Whether capital punishment saves lives by preventing homicide is an empirical question.
Thus the moral argument from deterrence turns on an assessment of
. the social effects of capital punishment in a way that the moral argument from retributivism does not. Because the moral argument from
deterrence turns on an empirical question, we shall tum shortly to an
evaluation of the empirical evidence. Before we do, however, two
matters should be clarified. The first involves a matter of definition
and the second a question of perspective.
26. One can combine the deterrence and desert arguments, and might have to if several
murderers had to be executed to deter one homicide. As presented, it is usually assumed that
one execution will deter several homicides, and it is the argument in this form that will be
examined most closely.
27. It is not necessarily the case that an execution is justified within the premises of deterrence theory whenever more than one murder is thereby deterred. It may be that we should
value the known life of the condemned higher than the unknown lives which will be preserved
at some future time. See McKee & Sesnowitz, supra note 9.
28. See, e.g., Schedler, Capital Punishment and Its .Deterrent Effect, 4 Soc. THEORY &
Lyons, .Detellence Theory and Punishment ofthe Innocent, 84 ETHICS 346
(1974); Margolis, Capital Punishment, 2 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 269 (1977); Wertheimer, .Deterrence and Retribution, 86 ETHICS 181 (1976).

PRAc. 47-56 (1976);

29. See, e.g., Goldberg, On Capital Punishment, 85 ETHICS 67 (1974); van den Haag, supra
note 1, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. at 51; van den Haag, On .Deterrence and the .Death Penalty, 18
ETHICS 280 (1968).
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A. Preventive Effects
Up to this point I have referred to the process by which capital
punishment saves lives as "deterrence." But deterrence, which exists
when one refrains from criminal action because he fears punishment,
is only one of many ways that punishment can inhibit crime.30
Gibbs, for example, points to seven ways other than deterrence in
which punishment can prevent crime. He believes that two of these,
incapacitation (the fact that those executed cannot slay again) and
normative validation (the process by which punishment impresses
the upright and the undecided with the moral validity of the norm
proscribing homicide), might explain any significant tendency for regimes of capital punishment to lower homicide rates. 31
Gibbs's suggestion that incapacitation might explain apparent
deterrent effects of the death penalty is probably mistaken, for a substantial degree of incapacitation is built into· the lengthy prison
sentences that murderers receive in the absence of a death penalty.
Research suggests that murderers rarely kill in prison and are unlikely to engage in violent crime if they are paroled. Giardini and
Farrow, looking at 197 capital offenders in twenty-two states who
had been on parole for periods ranging from one to thirty-eight
years, report that only eleven violated parole by committing new offenses, and that none committed a homicide.32 In an editorial postscript to Giardini and Farrow, Sellin notes that as of 1956 only one
of 342 male prisoners paroled in California from first-degree murder
convictions between 1945 and 1954 had been returned to prison after
being convicted of murder. He also reports that none of sixty-three
first-degree murderers paroled in New York between the years 1930
and 1961 and none of 273 first-degree murderers paroled in Ohio
between 1945 and 1965 was returned to prison for committing a
homicide.33 Jayewardene, extrapolating from Finnish data, estimates that had Canada spared the seventy-two murderers it executed
between 1950 and 1964, and instead released them immediately upon
conviction, there would have been two additional homicides during
that fifteen-year period. If Canada had executed every one of its 262
capital murderers during those years, six lives is the most that might
30. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects efPunishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949
(1966).
31. See Gibbs, supra note 3.
32. Giardini & Farrow, The Paroling efCapital Offenders, in CAPITAL PuNISHMENT, supra
note 15, at 169.

33. Id. at 185-86.
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have been saved.34
The preventive effects of normative validation may be more substantial. Supporters of capital punishment are fond of quoting Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen, who wrote:
Some men probably abstain from murder because they fear that if they
committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why
they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged. 35

The argument is reasonable. It-may be that the main benefit of capital punishment is that it teaches people that it is wrong to kill. But
the opposite position is also reasonable. It may be that capital punishment teaches people that life is not sacred and that killing is not
always a moral wrong. 36
When I speak of the deterrent effect of capital punishment in my
review of the empirical literature, I will generally be using the term
as a shorthand reference for all the preventive effects associated with
a system of capital punishment. Data relating to capital punishment
have never been analyzed with an eye to separating deterrent from
normative validation effects, although the distinction might have important policy implications. If capital punishment reduces homicides predominently through deterrence, frequent executions might
be justified. If the reduction occurs primarily through normative
validation, an occasional execution every few years might prevent as
many deaths as a larger number.37
34. C. JAYEWARDENE, THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1977). There are problems with
Jayewardene's figures apart from the problems inherent in any extrapolation. The prediction
that substituting parole for 72 executions would mean only two deaths is based on homicide
rates where parole follows lengthy imprisonment. Paroling instead of executing might lead to
more homicides not only because of decreased incapacitation but also because of decreased
deterrence as well as the release of people at more violence-prone ages. On the other hand, it
is important to recognize that the case for preventing homicide by executing all first-degree
murderers might, consideration of desert aside, apply to all violent criminals. It is plausible
that the murder rate among those who have committed other violent crimes is at least as high,
after controlling for age at release, as the rate for former murderers. Finally, if the 262 murderers who were not executed were also not paroled, it is unlikely that they would commit
murders at the rate of paroled offenders, and so the decision not to execute would not cost as
much as six lives.
35. J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND (1883), quoted in E. VAN
DEN HAAG, supra note 1, PUNISHING CRIMINALS at 68-69.
36. q: Sykes & Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM,
Soc. R.E.v. 664 (1957) (juvenile delinquents learn to neutralize portions of dominant norms and
values, thus making their actions not seem morally wrong to them). See also the discussion of
Bowers and Pierce's research in text at notes 121-29 infra.
37. If this is true, we should be able empirically to separate effects of normative validation
from those of deterrence by determining whether single executions are more important than
execution rates in explaining homicide. However, it is also possible that people's subjective
fear of being executed for murder rises sharply with the first execution in a jurisdiction within
a given time period and rather less sharply thereafter.
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The potential impact of normative validation also confounds the
search for deterrence because while it is unlikely that an execution in
a capital punishment state will have a deterrent effect in a neighboring abolitionist state,38 it is plausible that its normative validation
effects will extend beyond state borders. We should not, however,
make too much of this point. Normative validation through exemplary punishment has never actually been shown to exist, and murder, particularly the kind of murder that results in the death penalty,
is so generally disapproved of at all levels of society that there is little
a priori reason to believe that the death penalty must be substituted
for life imprisonment to drive home the message that murder is
wrong.
B. A Common Sense Perspective

Few people approach the data relating capital punishment to deterrence without some expectation of what they will find. Often their
reaction to the data appears more reflective of their initial orientation than of the information presented. In principle, there is nothing
wrong with this. If one has a well-grounded theory suggesting a particular relationship, one should be more skeptical of data rejecting
that relationship than of data supporting it.39 Preconceptions or, to
give them a better sounding name, theoretical orientations, are also
helpful in that they alert us to aspects of problems that particular
data cannot illuminate. The dangers of strong theoretical orientations are that they may lead people obstinately to disregard the
strength of conflicting evidence, and they may lead empirical researchers to choose tests or stopping points that do not give evidence
counter to favored hypotheses a fair chance to appear. Such possibilities may be better evaluated if theoretical starting points are disclosed. I shall therefore sketch the preliminary orientation to the
data that appears most reasonable to me. The reader may compare
his preliminary orientation with mine, and may decide after reading
my analysis of the evidence whether I have been misled by the views
I begin with.
Instinctively, one would expect the death penalty to deter. Most
of us are sufficiently afraid of dying that we would take extreme action to avoid a clear threat of death, and most of us remember occa38. It is not impossible for it to have such an effect because deterrence is a subjective and
not an objective state. A potential killer might confuse another state's punishment system with
that of his own, and the publicity given to an execution may emphasize for some the
probability of getting caught, another outcome important to deterrence.
39. The orientation to statistics implicit here is commonly called Bayesian.
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sions when the fear of punishment caused us to refrain from taking
actions we deeply desired. However, our instincts regarding deterrence, like our retributive instincts, are insufficiently attentive to the
system in which capital punishment is embedded. They hold no necessary implications for the expected deterrent efficacy of capital punishment.
The most important attribute of the system of capital punishment
is the presence of life imprisonment as an alternative. This means
that it is only the marginal deterrent effect of capital punishment that
is important. The issue is not whether we slay murderers or free
them; it is whether we send them to their death or to prison for life.40
It is difficult to select from the array of activities which a death threat
might induce us to drop any which we would engage in if the threat
were instead that we would only be imprisoned for life. Of course to
deny any marginal deterrent effect to the death penalty is not to deny
the possibility that punishment deters, nor is it to deny the plausibility of a theory that postulates, within certain limits, an association
between the severity of threatened punishment and the degree of deterrent effect. Thus, the plausibility of deterrence theory and the evidence that supports it does not necessarily imply a .deterrent effect of
capital punishment.41
The second aspect of capital punishment that suggests a minimal
deterrent effect is the relative infrequency with which the death penalty is imposed.42 Rarely has a state executed a substantial percent40. To the extent people perceived convicted murderers as commonly serving terms of less
than life at the time the data I shall review were collected, one might expect more of a marginal deterrent effect to capital punishment than where life imprisonment was regarded as the
likely alternative. This would render equivocal the message conveyed by studies showing a
deterrent effect of capital punishment, for it is possible that deterrent effects would have been
the same had those executed been sent to prison for life. It is also the case that some convicted
killers receive sentences of less than life imprisonment and many if not most serve less than a
life term even if so sentenced. It may be that the publicity surrounding death sentences suggests that the overall sanction system for murder is more severe than it in fact is or would seem
to be if the most serious offenders received and served life terms. This too would lead one to
expect a deterrent effect to be associated with capital punishment.
41. Isaac Ehrlich, for example, writes as if this were the case. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Mark,
Fear of.Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 293 (1977). The point can be illustrated with an example involving sentences other than death. A community concerned about overtime parking
enacts a law providing a mandatory ten-year prison sentence for those who allow their parking
meters to expire. While a life sentence is clearly more onerous than a ten-year sentence, there
is little reason to expect it will deter more. If the ten-year sentence does not persuade everyone
to leave his car at home, it is unlikely that the life sentence will do this. For those who do
park, it is hard to imagine how they can be any more careful concerning the time remaining on
their meters than they will be if the penalty for letting the meter expire is ten years.
42. Conway has suggested that this feature may increase the marginal deterrent effect of
capital punishment. See Conway, Capital Punishment and .Deterrence: Some Consideration in
.Dialogue Form, 3 PHILOSOPHY & PuB. A.FF. 431 (1974). He points out that while the certainty
of capital punishment might not be much more terrifying than the certainty of life imprison-
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age of its homicide offenders, and in most states at most times the
proportion executed has been quite low. 43 Low execution rates suggest limited deterrence because, however much people fear death,
they commonly prefer immediate gratification to a statistically
higher chance of an unduly early demise. Decisions to smoke and to
ignore auto seat belts are common examples. Supporters of capital
punishment might argue that the lesson is that all killers should be
executed,44 but in reality we are unlikely ever to execute a large proportion of our homicide offenders.45 The Supreme Court has not
been reluctant to interfere with state procedures that do not allow
adequate consideration of mitigating factors, 46 and most of the modem retributivists who have made the intellectual case for restoring
capital punishment believe death is the deserved sanction for only a
minority of homicides. In any case, whatever the future incidence of
capital punishment, the studies we shall examine deal with situations
where death was the penalty for only a small proportion of all murderers. For this reason if no other, we might expect these studies to
reveal little in the way of a deterrent effect.
There is a third reason why we should expect little deterrence
from the death penalty. The threat of death can only deter potential
criminals who loosely calculate the costs and rewards of their behavior. Many homicides occur when the offender is highly emotional or
under the influence of alcohol - situations in which rational calculation appears unlikely. Ironically, the very factors that inhibit rational calculation affect premeditation, so that homicide when
rationality is impaired is not likely to be punishable by death.47 To
ment, a 10% possibility of capital punishment may be much more frightening than a 10%
chance of life imprisonment. I expect the argument is sound, but it misses a crucial point.
Unless capital punishment is truly mandatory the perceived probability of the two punishments is unlikely to be equal. The sufficiently contemplative would-be murderer is likely to
perceive his chance of drawing a life sentence at 40% in an abolitionist jurisdiction and his
chance of drawing the death penalty at 2% (with a 38% chance of a life sentence) in a retentionist jurisdiction.
43. Bowers estimates that only about 2% of all homicides before 1950 and fewer than 1%
after 1950 resulted in executions. w. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 24 (1974). This reflects, in part, the facts that not all killers are caught and not all homicides are capital. If, as
some evidence suggests, between 15 and 25% of all pre-1960 homicides were in principle capital, executions have been the fate of at most IO to 15% of all capital murderers in modem
times.
44. Lehtinen, supra note 12. ·
45. See Morris, Hans Mattick and the .Death Penalty: Sentimental Noles on Two Topics, IO
ToL. L. REv. 299, 311 (1979); Murchison, Toward a Perspective on the .Death Penalty Cases, 21
EMORY LJ. 469, 552-53 (1978).
46. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
47. Ideally, the search for deterrence would exclude such homicides or at least treat them
separately from premeditated murders, but the available data do not allow this. The statistical
work, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that the proportion of capital to noncapital homi-
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the extent that nonpremeditated murders predominate in homicide
statistics, we can expect that deterrence will be relatively unimportant in determining homicide rates.
The three features that make it unlikely that capital punishment
deters many homicides should not mitigate the effects of normative
validation to nearly the same degree. Although a life sentence carries the message that murder is wrong, our willingness to apply the
death penalty may be peculiarly effective in creating this impression.
The infrequency of executions may not interfere with the normative
message conveyed. Indeed, frequent executions might be counterproductive if normative validation is the goal, for at some point even
a justified bloodbath might cheapen human life. Finally, while the
likelihood of calculating pleasure and pain may diminish with alcohol or passion, one beyond reflection may still retain a sense of right
and wrong and be influenced by it. Thus, those features of capital
punishment which make us skeptical about whether it can be expected to deter should not make us doubt the possibility of normative validation. If we do not expect to find evidence of normative
validation in the data, it is because we do not expect state executions
to convey a sense of the sacredness of life or because we believe that
message is so fully conveyed by other social institutions that those
who have not learned to respect life in other settings are unlikely to
learn this lesson from an occasional death sentence. To my mind
these latter expectations are at least as plausible as the expectation of
a normative validation effect.
The discussion of why we should not ordinarily expect capital
punishment to be a substantial deterrent also suggests situations
where a deterrent effect is plausible. Capital punishment might, for
example, be expected to deter homicides by those serving life
sentences and by those who have committed but have not yet been
arrested for crimes punishable by life imprisonment, particularly
cides is relatively stable across states and over time. To the extent it is not, actual deterrent
effects could be either hidden or unduly emphasized in the data we shall examine. In recent
years there has been a dramatic rise in the ratio of stranger to family-friend murders. Since
family murders are usually crimes of passion punished as second-degree murder or manslaughter, while stranger murders are more often first-degree murders, it might appear that this
means there has been an increase in more deterrable kinds of homicides. This is not necessarily the case. Strangers murders in recent years are more often committed by juveniles who
may be less responsive than adults to threats qf future harm and who may know that as a
matter oflaw or policy they are unlikely to receive the death penalty. Also, there has been an
increase in felony murders. While these are typically capital, many are premeditated in only a
constructive sense. If, for example, a gunman in the course of a robbery shoots a bullet into
the ceiling to scare the victim and a piece of plaster falls killing him, it may be considered a
felony murder. The data in the studies we shall discuss pertain generally to periods before
these trends were well established, whatever their implications.
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crimes such as kidnapping which allow time for rational reflection
on the threat posed by witnesses. In these situations the marginal
threat may loom large48 and we might reasonably predict that the
rate of homicides by life offenders is lower in death penalty than in
abolitionist states. The question of whether we :find this pattern is
like the question of whether we fail to :find those deterrent effects
whose implausibility I have suggested in that it is a subject for empirical inquiry. Whatever our preconceptions, we should be open to
the data.
Other kinds of homicides that one might think particularly likely
to be deterrable by the threat of capital punishment are murders of
police and prison guards, contract killings, and murders by terrorists.
The murder of police and prison guards appears more amenable to
deterrence than ordinary murder because potential killers might anticipate a higher than average probability of the death penalty for
such slayings and so our second reason for being skeptical of the
deterrent efficacy of the death penalty does not apply. However, at
least in the case of police murders, the incentive to kill to avoid all
punishment may be so strong as to overwhelm all deterrent effects.
Contract killings appear a good bet for deterrence because the
rationality of the decision to kill means that our third reason for being skeptical of deterrence does not apply. Here, however, our instincts probably betray us because contract killers are apparently like
most professionals in that they are specially skilled. Hence, they are
rarely caught. Conceivably the presence of capital punishment
could raise the market price of contract killings, and thereby save a
few lives by reducing the demand for the services of professional
killers. The number of lives saved would be a function of the elasticity of that demand. One would expect that number to be small, for
those who dislike other persons intensely enough or who are otherwise so interested in their death as to hire a killer are unlikely to be
dissuaded by small increases in price.
With respect to homicides by terrorists, Andenaes has convincingly argued that when a revolution is about to succeed or an invader about to be expelled, capital punishment is a substantially
48. What is crucial is the perception of the offender. The person under life sentence may
perceive a killing as destroying all hope for parole, while the kidnapper may believe a life
sentence is not likely unless he kills. Thus, deterrence theory warns us that in the absence of
capital punishment stringent sentences or high mandatory punishments may have serious
criminogenic effects.in a small number of cases. The lesson may, however, be to change the
sentence structure rather than to institute the death penalty. There may well be ways to make
life sentences more onerous for those who kill while serving or facing life sentences. If so, the
death penalty might again be relatively unimportant at the margin.
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more effective deterrent than a life sentence because no offender expects a life sentence to last more than a few months.49 However, this
is not the situation in the United States today and few potential killers are likely to be so deluded as to think so. Thus, we should not
expect to find this possibility of deterrence reflected in the data collected by those whose work we shall review.
Capital punishment might also prevent homicide if holding
"political prisoners" stimulates terrorist assaults to free them.
Strictly speaking, this is not a deterrent effect, but rather the removal
by execution of an incentive to crime. If the United States ever had
to deal with homicidal terrorists it might for this reason decide to
execute those it captured. Here, however, the system of punishment
is again crucial. While killing terrorists immediately would prevent
attempts to trade their lives for others, according terrorists due process of law before their execution would provide ample time for further terrorist activity, and impending executions might encourage
other terrorists to take retaliatory action. As with revolutionary killing, terrorist activity does not affect the studies we shall examine.
Finally, there are a number of ways in which we might plausibly
expect a system of capital punishment to increase the homicide rate.
The hypothesis that state executions degrade life and thus brutalize
is intuitively as plausible as the theory of normative validation.
There have apparently been cases in which people sought execution
as a means of suicide and so, presumably, would not have killed in a
state with no death penalty.50 Those who think they are going to be
executed for a crime may kill more recklessly to avoid capture than
those who believe that life imprisonment is the maximum punishment. Even killing terrorists without due process may cost more
lives than it saves, for r~venge may be more likely than attempts to
take hostages for ransom.
C. The Empirical Research
Having defined what we mean by deterrence and sketched the
outline of a common sense perspective, we shall now examine the
principal research on deterrence to see if the findings conform with
these common sense expectations. If they do, we should expect to
49. Andenaes, supra note 30, at 967-68.
50. See, e.g., Diamond, Murder and the .Death Penalty: A Case Report, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 445; Solomon, Capital Punishment as Suicide
and as Murder, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 432; West,
supra note 11, at 426-27. On the general issue of possible brutalization, see Glaser, Capital
Punishment - .Deterrent or Stimulus to Murder? Our Unexamined .Deaths and Penalties, 10
TOL. L. REV. 317 (1979).
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find little evidence that the existence of capital punishmnent deters.
We shall not, however, be able unequivocally to attribute a failure to
find deterrence to those reasons which suggest that the death penalty
has little deterrent impact at the margin. It is possible that the death
penalty does deter but that its deterrent impact is offset by
homicidogenic effects. Should the extant research conflict with our
expectations, we might, depending on the quality and consistency of
the research results, have to reconsider our position: sufficient data
of sufficient quality showing a deterrent or nondeterrent effect must
be respected. 51 If findings are mixed, we cannot escape the problem
of evaluating conflicting evidence, for in a highly politicized area of
social science it makes no sense simply to count the number of articles on each side. If the evidence is so mixed as not to suggest a
conclusion, we should not lightly abandon our original theories unless our look at the data suggests that some of our premises are
wrong. These judgments apply not only to the perspective I have
presented but also to the differing perspectives of readers who have
not been persuaded by my attempt to articulate what I perceive as
common sense.
1. Sellin and Others
The early research on capital punishment, by which I mean all
the work before Furman v. Georgia, 52 failed to show that capital punishment deterred homicide. Although a failure to show a deterrent
effect does not mean one does not exist, by 1972 there had been a
enough different work so that the conclusion that capital punishment
does not deter appeared justified to most social scientists.
The work of one man, Thorsten Sellin, dominates this period, but
before we look at Sellin's work, other research deserves mention. In
an important early study, Schuessler examined several different
kinds of data, using both a comparative and a before-and-after approach.53 He reports that average homicide rates for the three fiveyear periods beginning in 1931 tend to be no higher (and are often
lower) in the abolitionist states of Rhode Island, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota than in their retentionist neighbors. He presents
51. This is not to say that the research individually is of a generally high quality. All of it
is fl.awed, some seriously so. Fortunately the flaws are often different, so that weaknesses of
one study are strengths of another. Thus the research as a body is stronger than the sum of its
parts. The major flaws common to some of the best studies are the limitations posed by homicide rate data that do not distinguish premeditated and nonpremeditated murders and the
paucity of valid data measuring other variables of interest over time.
52. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
53. Schuessler, The JJetellent I'!fluence ofthe JJeath Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952).

1198

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:1177

data from Sweden and the Netherlands which show no apparent increase in homicide rates attributable to the abolition of the death
penalty. He points out that South Dakota, which went from an abolitionist to a retentionist state in 1939, saw its homicide rate fall from
1.8 per 100,00054 population to 1.5 during the next decade, but notes
that North Dakota, which remained abolitionist, saw its rate fall
from 1.8 to 1.1.
Schuessler also looks at the impact of executions. He finds that
for forty-one death penalty states the correlation between the
number of executions per thousand homicides and the homicide rate
is -.26.55 This is in the direction predicted by deterrence theory, but
it is small and presumably statistically insignificant. 56 Contrary to
the predictions of deterrence theory, when states are grouped into
quartiles according to their homicide rates, the quartile composed of
states with the highest homicide rates has a higher execution risk
than the next two lower quartiles. Schuessler summarizes his view of
his findings in the conclusion that "[t]he fact that men continue to
argue in favor of the death penalty on deterrence grounds may only
demonstrate man's ability to confuse tradition with proof, and his
related ability to justify his established way of behaving."57
Research investigating the deterrence question from different
perspectives yields results consistent with Schuessler's conclusions.
Dann examined homicides in Philadelphia for sixty days before and
54. All homicide rates described are per 100,000 population. This base will no longer be
noted in the text.
55. A correlation coefficient is a way of su=arizing the association between two variables. If the correlation coefficient is positive, increases in one variable tend to be associated
with increases in the other. If it is negative increases in one variable tend to be associated with
decreases in the other. A correlation of-.26 between execution rates and homicide rates suggests a moderate tendency for states high in execution rates to be low in homicide rates. The
explanatory power of a correlation coefficient is best estimated by the square of that coefficient.
Thus a correlation coefficient of -.26 means that if one knows the values taken by one variable
he can explain about 7% of the variance (not 26%) in the associated variable.

56. A significance test indicates the probability that a pattern that characterizes certain
data such as a pattern of association might be attributable to chance or random factors and not
reflect actual patterns in the population being studied. The conventional level of statistical
significance in the social sciences is .05 which means that one is justified in dismissing the
hypothesis that a relationship is an artifact of chance if random effects alone could not be
expected to result in a relationship like the one found on more than 5 occasions in 100 examined (or I occasion in 20). There is nothing sacred about the conventional .05 level. For
some purposes one is justified in choosing a less rigorous standard to evaluate the possibility of
random effects and for other purposes a more rigorous standard is appropriate.
Schuessler does not report a significance test. I presume the correlation is insignificant
primarily because of the weight that Schuessler believes it deserves. Note that the correlation
might be biased so as to favor a finding of deterrence because the number of homicides enters
the numerator of the homicide rate and the denominator of the execution risk measure.
57. Schuessler, supra note 53, at 62.
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after a publicized mass execution58 while Savitz looked at first-degree murder rates in Philadelphia for the eight weeks before and after four highly publicized trials that culminated in death sentences. 59
Neither study reports a deterrent effect although both are hampered
in their search for deterrence by the relatively small number of
homicides that could be expected to occur in the periods they examine. Samuelson used Delaware's decisions to abolish capital punishment in 1958 and to reinstitute it in 1961 as the occasion for a
before-and-after study. 60 He finds nothing which suggests that the
homicide rate was affected by the period of abolition.
Perhaps the most intriguing finding during this period was reported by Graves, a California medical doctor. 61 Graves took advantage of the fact that California scheduled all its executions on
Fridays to compare homicide rates on the days preceding and following execution Fridays with the rates for the same days in nonexecution weeks immediately preceding, following or falling between execution weeks. He reports that execution weeks have significantly more homicides than nonexecution weeks on Thursdays and
Fridays and significantly fewer on Saturdays and Sundays. It is not
clear what one should make of these curious results. One possibility
is that the prospect of an execution has brutalization effects that
culminate on the evening of the execution and are followed by deterrent effects after the fact of execution sinks in. A more plausible
explanation may be that this is one of those occasions when statistical significance is achieved by chance. Enough research has been
done on deterrence that one can expect random factors to result in
some surprising associations. 62
While the early studies all suggest the same conclusion - that
capital punishment does not deter - collectively they were probably
less important in persuading the scientific establishment of that con58. R. DANN, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1935).

59. Savitz,A Study in Capitol Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Set. 338
(1958).
60. Samuelson, Why Was Capitol Punishment Restored in .Delaware?, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 148 {1969).
6 l. Graves, The .Deterrent Effect of Capitol Punishment in Coltfomio, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note l, at 322.
62. Because of its policy implications, deterrence research is unusual in the social sciences
in that results that fail to reject the null hypothesis (ie., the hypothesis that the death penalty
does not deter) are often published. Thus a possible explanation of the minority of studies that
show a deterrent effect is that despite achieved levels of statistical significance their results are
due to chance. Enough independent investigations of the death penalty have been done that a
few should show "statistically significant" evidence of deterrence or brutalization even if the
deviation from patterns that would be expected if the death penalty did not deter were only
random.
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clusion than the work of one man, Thorsten Sellin. Sellin's basic
methodology was to compare the yearly homicide rates of neighboring retentionist and abolitionist jurisdictions.63 One would expect
neighboring jurisdictions to be alike with respect to factors other
than the death penalty that lead people to commit crimes. If so, and
if the death penalty deters, retentionist states should have lower
homicide rates than nearby abolitionist jurisdictions.64 Sellin
showed that they do not. 65 Indeed, for the period from 1920 to 1955,
abolitionist states tend to have lower homicide rates than their retentionist neighbors. Trends in homicide rates tend to be similar in
neighboring states, suggesting that contiguous states are affected in
much the same way by changes in social or environmental conditions that are conducive to or inhibit homicide. However, the implications of Sellin's time series approach are clouded because his data
also reveal that one may not assume as a general proposition that
neighboring states are similar on factors other than the death penalty
that encourage or inhibit homicide. If neighbors were similar, Sellin's data would not - absent an implausibly large brutalization effect attributable to capital punishment - show the considerable gap
in homicide rates that characterizes certain pairs of states such as
Ohio and Michigan or Colorado and Kansas. The assumption is
tenable for other states paired by Sellin, such as Iowa and Wisconsin, but it remains unproven.
A brick is not a wall. Sellin did not stop with his paired comparisons. He also looked at the way homicide rates changed when states
abolished and/or reinstituted the death penalty. Data from Maine,
Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, Tennessee, Oregon, Washington, Kansas, South Dakota, and Delaware all fail to provide evidence that the presence of the death penalty deters. These results,
when coupled with the contiguous state research, provide more powerful evidence of nondeterrence, for the methodologies are complementary. The contiguous state approach controls well for trends in
63. See T. SELLIN, supra note 13.
64. If one takes the deterrence doctrine seriously this conclusion is particularly strong because one would expect those intending to kill others to lure them to abolitionist jurisdictions
and one would expect those engaging in felonies that might involve murder - such as armed
robbery - to go out of their way to commit their crimes in abolitionist jurisdictions. Thus, a
number of murders in abolitionist states will be murders that but for the lack of the death
penalty would have occurred in the retentionist jurisdiction. Such effects would, of course, be
mitigated by statistics which lumped unpremeditated homicides with first-degree murders and
by the fact that in many first-degree murders the intent to kill does not arise until shortly
before the slaying occurs. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to compare first-degree and
felony murder rates for nearby border cities in retentionist and abolitionist jurisdictions.
65. Sellin's data are summarized in six diagrams in his book. T. SELLIN, supra note 13, at
26-33.
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paired states but not for different initial conditions, while the beforeand-after studies control better for the initial conditions of the states
examined than they do for changes in these conditions over time.
Even if they stood alone, the before-and-after studies, although
crudely done, would be strong evidence. While it is plausible to suppose that capital punishment is abolished when homicide rates are
falling and reinstituted when they are rising, thus explaining the lack
of effects, in many cases the period of abolition was so brief that no
trend could have been established. Furthermore, the homicide data
from Arizona, Colorado, and Iowa are based on convictions. If juries are more reluctant to convict in close cases when the death penalty is likely, the evidence from these states is biased against a
finding of nondeterrence. 66
Sellin reports a number of other statistics as well. He collects
information on homicides or murder convictions before and after
changes in the death penalty in Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria,
New Zealand, England, and parts of Australia and Germany. Nothing in these data suggests that the existence of capital punishment
has a deterrent effect. 67 He applies his comparative technique, controlling for city size, to police homicides from 1919-1954 in abolitionist and retentionist states, again not finding deterrence. 68 He
reports that the annual average of policemen killed during the years
1961-1963, about 1.3 per 10,000, was the same in the abolitionist
states as in their death-penalty neighbors.
Sellin also addresses the question of whether the death penalty is
needed to deter those serving life terms. 69 His 1965 data from fortyseven jurisdictions show that thirty-seven of these shared a total of
sixty-one prison homicides perpetrated by fifty-nine known and nine
unknown offenders. Eight of the victims (but none of the eight
prison staff who were killed) and eleven of the offenders were in abolitionist states. Of the thirteen offenders charged with first-degree
murder, two were imprisoned in the abolitionist state of Michigan
and eleven were in death penalty states. The three offenders who
66. One might argue, implausibly I believe, that murderers would be more willing to fight
to the death to avoid capture or to make special efforts to escape in death penalty states than in
abolitionist jurisdictions. More plausibly, one may note that if capital punishment prevents
murder primarily through normative validation, brief periods of abolition are unlikely to have
a substantial effect on the homicide rate.
67. T. SELLIN, supra note 13, at 38-50.
68. Id at 55-57. These data were collected in a mail survey. They are weak in that the
nonresponse rate was more than 50% and the reporting police departments may have differentially suffered failures of institutional memory.
69. Sellin, The J)eath Penalty and Police Safety, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 15, at
138.
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had been convicted of second-degree murders and the nine who had
been convicted of capital crimes other than homicide were imprisoned in jurisdictions that allowed the death penalty.
It is difficult to interpret these data without information about the
number of people imprisoned for various crimes under various conditions in the different states, but one may risk a few conclusions.
First, the 1965 data give us no reason to believe that the existence of
the death penalty has a special deterrent effect on those serving life
sentences or lengthy prison terms. (The fact that all the staff members killed were in death penalty states is of particular interest.) Second, those imprisoned for violent crimes have a disproportionate
tendency to kill, and murderers may have a disproportionate tendency to kill within the group of violent criminals.7 Finally, if all
capital offenders were executed, a meaningful savings in life would
occur.7 I However, our inability to predict dangerousness means that
such a policy would take many more lives than it would save. Furthermore, the vast majority of those executed would be killed unnecessarily, for if allowed to live they would not subsequently have
committed murder.
The research by Sellin and others which fails to find deterrence
shares more than a common conclusion. Each of the researchers approaches his data in a relatively straightforward fashion, easily understood by laypersons. In every case it is easy to specify the results
that would indicate that capital punishment deters homicide, and in
no case are such results found. Some of the studies, particularly Sellin's work, are attentive to the problem of controlling for factors that
might mask a deterrent effect, but none uses the techniques of modem mathematical social science to hold these factors constant. Some
more recent research shares this commonality of style and, interestingly enough, supports the same conclusion.72

°

_

70. It may be that the prospect of a lengthy sentence gives one a special incentive to kill
either in the process of escape or out of frustration. If so, lives might be saved within prisons
by reducing the sentences of serious felons. The problem is finding the point at which these
savings are counterbalanced by increased crime outside the walls.
71. The net savings depends on the number of capital offenders among those killed by
capital offenders. Sellin does not provide these figures.
72. The one exception I discovered is Lester. In a one page "article," Executions as a l}eterrent to Homicides, 44 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 562 (1979), he reports that between 1930 and
1955, in 53.6% of 828 instances in which a state executed one or more offenders, the incidence
of homicide decreased the following year. In only 46.7% of the 818 instances in which a state
executed no one was there such a decrease. The difference is significant at the .01 level and,
according to Lester, applies to years in which the incidence was increasing as well as to years
in which the incidence was decreasing. In a second "article" of two paragraphs he reports that
the likelihood that an execution year will be followed by a diminution in executions tends to
~ greater for years when executions are more common. Lester, l)eterring Effect ofExecutions
on Murder as a Function of Number and Proportion of Exei:iltkiizs, 45 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP.
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King, for example, searched for a brutalization effect by comparing homicide rates for those months when South Carolina's major
newspapers carried execution stories with the average of the rates for
the same months during the years immediately preceding and following. Although King does not find compelling evidence of brutalization, he finds nothing suggestive of deterrence.73 Fattah finds
nothing in Canadian data which suggests that either Canada's 1962
moratorium on the death penalty or its decision in 1967 to abolish
the death penalty for all but police murders had any effect on Canada's homicide rate. 74 Although that rate rose dramatically after
1962, the increase correlates almost perfectly with the increase in
other categories of violent crime and is not as great. If the death
penalty deterred, one would_ expect formerly capital crimes to increase at a faster rate than the rate for crimes whose penalties had
not changed.75 McKee and Sesnowitz, using regression analysis,76
598 (1979). In neither article does Lester present enough of the underlying data or a detailed
enough explanation of his approach to allow an intelligent discussion of his findings. In both
articles it is possible that the result Lester identifies is either a regression artifact or a result of
including years after 1960 when executions were rare and homicide rates were increasing for
reasons that may have had nothing to do with executions.
A regression artifact is a tendency for rates that are extreme at one point in time to be less
extreme upon remeasurement because of the nature of the contribution that random factors
make to extreme scores. For example, if a homicide rate reflects both consistent causes and
random effects, years following years with exceptionally high homicide rates are likely to have
lower rates because random effects in the extreme year are likely to have been consistently
conducive to homicide (thus making it extreme) while in the subsequent year they are likely to
be more balanced since random effects usually, but not always, balance out. If homicide
sentences are more likely in years with high murder rates one would expect that subsequent
years, when executions are carried out, will have lower rates even if the death penalty does not
deter because of normal statistical fluctuations. If executions are carried out in the year of the
sentence, one would expect years following execution years to have lower homicide rates regardless of deterrence.
73. King, The Brutalization Effect: Execution Publicity and the Incidence
South Carolina, 51 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978).
.

ef Homicide in

74. Fattah, The Canadian Experience with Abolition ofthe Death Penalty, in EXECUTIONS
supra note 43, at 121.

IN AMERICA,

75. One might argue, implausibly I believe, that most violent assaults are with intent to kill
or at least with the knowledge that killing might result and so are deterred by the death penalty. However, the increase in crime in the 1960s was not confined to violent crimes. Other
crimes, like auto theft, also increased at rates faster than the murder rate. It appears there was
a general breakdown in "law and order" during this period, perhaps reflecting an increase in
the proportion of people in their most crime-prone years.
76. McKee & Sesnowitz, Capital Punishment: The Canadian Experience, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL
145 (1977).
"Regression analysis" is a statistical technique for exploring a relationship between two
variables while (in the multivariate case) holding the impact of other variables constant. For
example, consider the equation ofH = B1E + B2G where H = the homicide rate; E = the rate
at which convicted killers are executed; G = handgun sales per 1000 inhabitants and B 1 and
B2 are coefficients that indicate the weights that should be given to the two explanatory or
independent variables, E and G, so that they will best predict to H, the dependent variable or
ECON.
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and Klein77 make the same point with respect to United States data.
variable to be explained. This equation indicates that homicide rates in (let us say) a state are
determined by the state's execution rate and gun ownership rate.
In a regression analysis based on the above equation the investigator says, in effect, let us
take the model or hypothesized relationship that is specified in the equation and let us take the
data we have collected on homicide rates, execution rates, and gun ownership and let us see if
the data are consistent with the model. We learn from the output of the regression analysis
how well we can predict to homicide rates ifwe know execution rates and gun ownership rates.
This is typically indicated by the square of the multiple correlation coefficient, reported as R2,
We can also learn whether either or both of our independent variables enhance our ability to
predict to the homicide rate. This is typically done by evaluating the coefficients or weights
attached to the independent variables. ·rf they are zero or sufficiently close to zero that we are
unwilling to discard the possibility that random factors explain any apparent relationship between independent and dependent variables (a possibility evaluated with the aid of significance tests), we tentatively conclude that changes in the independent variable are not
associated with (and hence cannot cause) changes in the dependent variable.
An advantage of multiple regression is that it can reveal situations where an apparent association between two variables is an artifact of the way they both relate to a third variable. For
example, suppose we had originally specified a model H = B1E and had found that the higher
a state's execution rate the higher its homicide rate. Someone challenges this, arguing that
homicides are really influenced by gun ownership and that we were fooled because states with
high execution rates are also states in which many people buy guns. We then examine the data
to see how they fit an equation that includes both E and G as independent variables. If the
coefficient on the execution variable is close to zero it indicates that the critic's point was well
taken. Once we take account of gun ownership rates, execution rates have no apparent effect
on homicides. If the coefficient of E is negative, implying the lower an execution rate the
higher a homicide rate, it suggests that if states had similar gun ownership rates those that
executed more would have fewer homicides. Our initial pattern was re_versed because, so our
theory tells us, states that tend to execute their murderers are states where people like to buy
guns, behavior that conduces to homicide and is associated with executions.
But, someone might ask, could not the relationship between homicides and executions be
again reversed if a third explanatory variable were introduced into the model? The answer is
that it could be. When a model does not include adequate indicators of those independent
variables that in fact determine the state of the dependent variables or when the mathematical
form of the variables does not reflect the relationship that actually exists in the data (as when
an equation implies a linear relationship between changes in the independent and dependent
variables and the actual relationship is curvilinear) the model is said to be misspecified. Practically speaking, no mathematical model confined to measurable variables can ever capture the
complexity of the real world, so all models are inevitably misspecified. Whether the problem is
so serious as to render the relationships that a model reveals, or the absence of any revealed
relationships, suspect varies with the particular model and the behavior it is designed to reflect.
In making such judgments, theory is crucial. If a model contains those variables that are
theoretically plausible or adequate proxies for them, and if it specifies a reasonable relationship among variables, results consistent with the model should be given great weight and inconsistent results should call the theory into question. On the other hand, if a model is
misspecified by, for example, omitting a theoretically important variable, the conclusions suggested by the model are suspect since the inclusion of a theoretically important variable can
dramatically change the coefficients of those variables incorporated in the model.
Finally, one must recognize an inductive side to the task of model building. It is co=on
for researchers to try to fit a variety of models to their data. The one which fits best is interpreted as the most likely representation of the actual relationship between variables. If the fit
is good and the relationships reasonable in the sense that they are theoretically plausible and
consistent with other research, we have reason to believe the model portrays important aspects
of the relationship, but we cannot be certain that some model we have not tested does not do a
better job.
77. Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of
the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION 336 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin
eds. 1978).

May 1981]

.Desert and .Deterrence

1205

Fattah's conclusion that the abolition of the death penalty is not responsible for the general increase in homicides is supported by his
finding that police homicides, which remained capital, increased
along with other murders.
Phillips, looking at homicides in London during the periods surrounding twenty-two well-publicized executions, presents results
reminiscent of and as puzzling as Graves's findings. 78 If the four
weeks before the twenty-two executions are taken as a baseline, one
sees in Phillips' data a sharp dip in the number of homicides during
the execution week and the week thereafter. However, during the
second through fifth weeks after these executions, the homicid.e rate
rises sufficiently above that of the baseline period as to, within the
limits of plausible statistical error, offset any immediate deterrent
impact. Phillips also presents data suggesting that the more publicized an execution the greater its temporary deterrent impact. Unfortunately, he does not tell us whether the more publicized
executions contribute disproportionately to delayed brutalization effects. This is possible. In the seven days following each of Phillips's
eleven most publicized executions, there are more than three times as
many homicides (sixteen in all) than there are in seven days following each of his eleven least-publicized executions (five in all).
Finally, Bowers, in an analysis of abolitionist and contiguous
death penalty states, finds that the increase in homicides after the
informal judicial moratorium on executions in 1967 was slightly
greater in the abolitionist states than in their contiguous death penalty counterparts.79 If capital punishment deterred, one would expect those states which had lost an effective deterrent to have the
higher rates of increase. Zeise! corroborates Bower's findings by
showing that, throughout the sixties, homicide rates in executing and
nonexecuting states (the abolitionist states and six states that executed no one after 1948) grew at almost the same rate. so
The strength of the research reviewed thus far rests not in individual studies but on the work taken as a whole. Deterrent effects of
capital punishment have been given many different kinds of chances
to appear. If capital punishment has any strong deterrent effects, it is
likely that some deterrence would have been evident. While it is
78. Phillips, Tlze JJeterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980).
79. EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 139-47.
80. Zeise!, Tlze JJeterrent Effect of the JJeath Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976 SUP. CT. REv.
317, 330.
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impossible to prove a negative, this failure to find a -deterrent effect
provides reason to believe that none exists.
2. Enter Ehrlich
Although there were occasional dissenters (never with empirical
evidence), the conclusion that the death penalty does not deter was
the general consensus of the scientific establishment until 1975. In
that year an economist, Isaac Ehrlich, published in his profession's
most prestigious journal what is probably the most important article
on capital punishment to date. 81 The article, aptly subtitled "A
Question of Life and Death," is important for its timing, its methods,
and its results.
Ehrlich apparently finished work on his article about the time the
Supreme Court was to hear argument on the constitutionality of the
first of the post-Furman capital punishment statutes. At a time when
the article was still unpublished, the Solicitor General of the United
States included a draft version as an appendix to the government's
pro-capital punishment brief. Because the Court eventually put the
issue of capital punishment off for a term, both the article and pieces
in rebuttal were in print by the time Gregg v. Georgia 82 and its companion cases were decided. The use of Ehrlich's article by the Solicitor General guaranteed that it would attract substantial attention,
perhaps more than it merited. 83
One aspect of this scenario deserves at least passing mention, although it is admittedly a digression from my chosen task. Ehrlich's
research cannot be fully appreciated without the benefit of the scientific comment it engendered. Had the Supreme Court not delayed its
decision on the death penalty, there would have been little or no
prior opportunity for others to examine Ehrlich's work. Perhaps because of the Court's delay, there has not been the discussion of the
scientific and legal ethics of submitting controversial unpublished research to the Court which the earlier disclosure of the Solicitor General's appendix might otherwise have engendered. The legal
community should explore this problem before the next occasion
arises. 84
81. Ehrlich, The .Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Lffe and .Death, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).

82. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
83. For example, Ehrlich's later cross-sectional study, which shows even greater deterrence
and is probably a sounder piece of research, has neither been fully replicated nor subjected to
the same degree of scrutiny. Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and .Deterrence: Some Further
Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. PoL. EcoN. 741 (1977).
84. The reader may correctly gather that I consider lhe ethical question a serious one,
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Ehrlich's study was important because it was explicitly based on
economic theory and because it brought the techniques of modem
econometrics to bear on the problem of deterrence and capital punishment. Its methods have stimulated enough research so that we
may credit Ehrlich with bringing a new paradigm to the study of the
death penalty and deterrence.
Ehrlich's article was important because its finding that executions
deterred homicide effectively reopened the deterrence controversy.
Its immediate effects are reflected in Justice Stewart's lead opinion in
Gregg v. Georgia, the case that restored death as a permissible penalty. Justice Stewart notes the debate occasioned by the statistical
attempts to evaluate the death penalty as a deterrent and concludes:
"The results simply have been inconclusive ." 85 Ehrlich's is the only
empirical study suggesting deterrence that Stewart cites in support of
this proposition. While it is unlikely that the- Court would have
decided Gregg differently but for Ehrlich's research, his results did
mean that some Justices were able to avoid confronting the difficult
question of how to justify a penalty that within the scientific community was generally acknowledged to take lives without compensating
savings.
Since Gregg, Ehrlich's research has been used to do more than to
establish the existence of an inconclusive debate. Van den Haag and
other modem retributivists have used Ehrlich's :findings to bolster
their case for the death penalty. 86 In a more overtly political context,
the effort to amend Michigan's constitution and end that state's 134
years without capital punishment has publicized Ehrlich's :findings in
its newspaper campaign. Clearly this is research that merits close
examination.
To call an article the most important in its field is high praise, but
this is about the last praise I shall have for Ehrlich. To anticipate
briefly, Ehrlich's 1975 article provides no support for the proposition
that the death penalty deters. It has stirred up the pond, but only to
muddy the waters at a time when we need to see clearly. There is
now a substantial body of research criticizing Ehrlich on technical
although I am not sure how I would answer it. It raises among other issues the question of the
obligation of an attorney to evaluate or seek an independent evaluation of the scientific adequacy of work he wishes to present to a court. It also raises ethical problems for the scientific
community whose members' work may be used in this way. I want to make it quite clear that I
do not intend the above as a criticism of Professor Ehrlich for the use made of his work. My
hearsay understanding is that the government sought out Ehrlich's study; he did not volunteer
it.
85. 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976) (emphasis added).
86. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS, supra note l; van den Haag,A Response to
Bedau, 1977 ARlz. ST. LJ. 797.
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and conceptual grounds. 87 The criticism is persuasive.
Ehrlich's study is a multivariate regression analysis of the relationship between annual homicide rates for the nation as a whole
and the rate at which convicted murderers were executed between
the years 1933 and 1969.88 The variables Ehrlich attempts89 to control include, most importantly, two measures of successful law enforcement: the probability of arrest for homicide and the probability
of conviction given arrest. They also include measures of population
characteristics that might affect the homicide rate, such as labor
force participation, unemployment rates, and changing proportions
87. See, e.g., Baldus & Cole,A Comparison ofthe Work ofThorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich
on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Barnett, Crime and
Capital Punishment: Some Recent Studies, 6 J. CRIM. JusT. 291 (1978); Black & Orsagh, New
Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions as a Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sci. Q. 616 (1978);
Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion ofDeterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment,
85 YALE LJ. 187 (1975); Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 77; McGahey, Dr. Ehrlich's Magic
Bullet: Economic Theory, Econometrics, and the Death Penalty, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
485 (1980); Passell & Taylor, The Detellent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67
AM. EcoN. REv. 445 (1977); Passell & Taylor, The Deterrence Controversy: A Reconsideration
of the Time Series, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 359;
Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359
(1976); Zeise!, supra note 80.
For Ehrlich's responses, see Ehrlich, J)etellence: Evidence and l'!ference, 85 YALE L.J. 209
(1975); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply, 67 AM, EcoN, REV. 452
(1977); Ehrlich & Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment
and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD, 35 (1977); Ehrlich & Mark, supra note 41.
88. Ehrlich estimates his model for a variety of periods ranging from 1933-1966 to 19351969 and 1941-1969. He also measures the conditional probability of execution in several
ways. Generally his results are consistent. Ehrlich transforms all variables except time into
their natural logarithms. Although he states that his results are robust with respect to functional form, others who have replicated Ehrlich's research, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, supra note
87; Klein, supra note 77; Passell & Taylor, supra note 87, report that the significance of the
execution variable disappears and the results sometimes become perversely positive if the nat•
ural values of the variables are used. Much of the technical exchange between Ehrlich and his
critics concerns the relative desirability of the logarithmic transformations.
Transforming data is commonly done and often wise. Logarithmic transformations of all
variables imply relationships in the form of elasticities (f.e., relationships in which a proportionate change in an independent variable is associated with a proportionate change in the
dependent variable) rather than linear relationships (f.e., relationships in which an incremental
change in an independent variable is associated with an incremental change in the dependent
variable). Decisions on transforming data depend primarily on what theory suggests about the
nature of the relationships, although there are tests that indicate inductively that one form may
better represent the true pattern of association. In the case of Ehrlich's work there is no strong
theoretical reason to prefer logarithmic to untransformed variables, althou'711 if Ehrlich's ar~ument in response to liis critics is accepted there may be some, albeit not d1spositive, inductive
reason. In research of this kind, relationships between variables are often similar in both direction and significance regardless of whether the data has been transformed. The fact that
Ehrlich's results are form dependent is, as his critics contend, a further reason to be suspicious
of them. This is because there is no good a priori reason to prefer a log-log specification to a
linear one, and not because there is anything inherently illegitimate about the transformation
procedure.
89. I use the word "attempts" because the quality of the data, particularly in the earlier
years with respect to such things as conviction rates, is quite problematic. See Bowers &
Pierce, supra note 87, at 187-92.
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of nonwhites. Ehrlich's most important finding is summarized in his
introduction: "On the average the tradeoffbetween the execution of
an offender and the lives of potential victims it might have saved was
of the order of magnitude of 1 for 8 for the period.1933-1967 in the
United States." 90 This is basically what Ehrlich's equations tell us. I
shall review only some of the less technical reasons why one who
conscientiously wishes to rest the moral case for capital punishment
on deterrence can get no comfort from Ehrlich's results.
Ehrlich criticizes Sellin's research on two counts: it con§iders
only the legal status of the death penalty and not its application, 91
and it fails to control other factors affecting the murder rate. 92
Baldus and Cole defend Sellin from both charges. 93 They point out
that in the debate over capital punishment the question is whether to
change from a death penalty to an abolitionist jurisdiction, a question which Sellin's work addresses directly but Ehrlich's does not.
They also point out that Sellin's matching method is an attempt to
control for other variables which in the particular context of capital
punishment may be as adequate as Ehrlich's. Finally, Baldus and
Cole present data for 1960 that arguably show that the states
matched by Sellin are similar on important law enforcement and ·socioeconomic characteristics. 94
Baldus and Cole are right on their first point, but their defense is
telling only if retentionist states will in the future follow historic patterns of sparing most of those eligible for execution. Ehrlich's findings are surely relevant to the policy debate, for if he is correct, states
adopting the death penalty may wish to change their patterns of sentencing,95 and there is moral justification for allowing them to do so.
On their second point, Baldus and Cole are more persuasive in
their attack than on defense. 96 They note that in a regression analysis, the omission of an important variable from the model tested may
1

90. Ehrlich, supra note 81, at 398.
91. Id
92. Ehrlich, .Deterrence: Evidence and Infare"nce, 85 Yale L.J. 209, 223-24 (1975).
93. Baldus & Cole, supra note 87, at 170.
94. Id at 179. The problem with these data are that they are for a single year, five years
after Sellin's time series ends. Furthermore, on some variables it is not clear what degree of
cross-state similarity is meaningful.
95. It should be noted that Ehrlich in his 1975 article, supra note 81, is quite restrained in
discussing the policy implications of his research. He recognizes that increased executions may
not be the preferred method of coping with the homicide problem and he never expresses
personal support for the death penalty.
96. As was mentioned in my discussion of Sellin's work, some of the gaps in the homicide
rates of matched states are so large that one can be sure that factors which significantly affect
homicide rates are not well controlled.
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not only prevent an adequate explanation of changes in the dependent variable (here the homicide rate), but may also distort the effects of those variables that have been included. Klein and his
coauthors, who make a similar point, suggest that the average length
of prison sentences for homicide and the availability of guns are two
omitted variables that may be crucial.97 Passell and Taylor would
add racial tension and the frustration of unrealized rising expectations to this list.9s
I shall make three criticisms of Ehrlich's work. One goes solely
to its policy implications while two challenge the validity of his results. In Ehrlich's model, the deterrent effects of the probability of
execution given conviction are dwarfed by the deterrent effects of the
probability of conviction given arrest. It is commonly thought that
the possibility of capital punishment makes it more difficult to convict, and there is evidence that supports this view.99 If the presence
of the death penalty were to reduce the conviction rate for homicide
by seventeen percent, Ehrlich's own findings indicate that executing
would be counterproductive. 100 My intuition is that the presence of
the death penalty would not reduce convictions this far, but it might
well reduce them to the point where the tradeoff between executions
97. Klein, supra note 77, at 345-46.
98. Passell & Taylor, supra note 87, 67 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. at 448.
99. Ellsworth and Ross report that in North Carolina when a mandatory death sentence
. for first-degree burglary replaced a discretionary one convictions for this offense went from an
annual average of 40 to an average of three. They also report a survey of 500 citizens in four
municipalities in California. Among proponents of the death penalty, 60% claimed that if they
sat on a jury in a murder trial they would require "much more" or "somewhat more" evidence
to vote guilty if the relevant penalty were death. Forty percent of those opposed to capital
punishment said they could never vote guilty in these circumstances. Ellsworth & Ross, .Public
Opinion and Judicial .Decisionmaking: An Example From Research on Capital .Punishment, in
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 152, 166-69. However, where
the death penalty is not mandatory it might be easier to convict because jury holdouts for
acquittal might compromise on a verdict that saves the defendant from death. Also the possibility of the death penalty, whether or not mandatory, may make it easier for prosecutors to
secure convictions by plea bargains.
100. In his 1975 article, Ehrlich notes that over the period 1933 to 1969 when the proportion of convicts executed for murder fell from 8% to zero, the probabilities of arrest and conviction given arrest generally increased. Ehrlich, supra note 81, at 405. In later responses to
critics, Ehrlich notes that the estimated unconditional risk of conviction decreases from 39% in
1960 to 31% in 1969. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 87, 67 AM. EcoN. REV. 452. (An unconditional risk of conviction is the probability of conviction without taking into account the
probability of arrest. Thus, one might report that 36% of all murders resulted in convictions an unconditioned rate when the murder is taken as the starting point - or that 55% of those
arrested for murder were convicted of it - a conviction rate conditioned on arrest.) However,
here Ehrlich may be reading too much into uncontrolled data. This decrease may result from
procedural constraints imposed on the police during this period or problems caused by case
overload. Depending on the source of the data, it may also reflect bargained pleas to offenses
other than homicide. Had the death penalty been imposed regularly during this period, the
unconditional conviction rate might have been still lower.
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and lives saved would have vitally different policy implications. One
might, for example, be substantially less willing to tolerate the prospect of innocent people being executed or the existence of invidious
discrimination within a system of capital punishment if each execution saved three lives rather than eight.
A second difficulty with Ehrlich's study, which he himself recognizes, is its failure to include any measure of the length of prison
sentences in general and the probability of life sentences in particular. This is not a mere technical deficiency; it is fundamental. Without some measure of the probability of life sentences, Ehrlich's
research does not address the fundamental issue in the debate. That
issue is not whether executions deter, but whether they deter more
than prison sentences for ltfe.
Nothing in Ehrlich's data suggests that there would have been
any diminution in deterrence had everyone who was executed been
sentenced to life imprisonment instead. The implication that Ehrlich
is finding a marginal effect depends on the assumption that the kinds
of murderers who would have been executed or sentenced to life imprisonment during periods of frequent executions were sentenced to
life imprisonment during periods when executions were infrequent.
Jayewardene tells us that this assumption is untenable in the case of
Canada. 101 During the late 1960s, when the death penalty ceased to
be applied to homicide offenders, the expectation of a term sentence
for less than life increased. Furthermore, the positive correlation between the increasing homicide rate and the expectation of a prison
term less than life was greater and statistically more significant than
the negative correlation between the expectancy of a death sentence
and the rising homicide rate. The same may be true of the United
States, for the same factors which lead a state to cease executing may
lead it to shorten its sentences so that the perceived penalty for even
serious homicide becomes considerably less than life imprisonment.102 Thus, aspects of the sentencing structure other than the
death penalty may entirely explain effects that Ehrlich would attribute to death.
The third problem with Ehrlich's research is so basic that if we
IOI.

C. JAYEWARDENE,

supra note 34.

102. The average time served for all nonnegligent homicides is remarkably short, typically
less than ten years and in many cases less than five. See, e.g., Glaser & Zeigler, Use of the
Death Penalty v. Outrage al Murder, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 333, 336 (1974). For a controversy over the implications Glaser and Zeigler draw from these data, see Bailey, Use of the
Death Penalty v. Outrage at Murder: Some Additional Evidence and Considerations, 22 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 31 (1976); Glaser, A Response to Bailey, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 40
(1976).
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accepted Ehrlich's model and thought his data sound we could properly regard his research as providing support for the proposition that
during the years when the death penalty was regularly employed executions did not deter. Replication of Ehrlich's research consistently
reveals that when data from the years 1965 through 1969 are eliminated from the analysis the impact of the conditional probability of
execution on the homicide rate is no longer statistically significant.
Indeed, excluding years after 1962 and treating variables in their
natural rather than logarithmic forms produces insignificantly positive associations between the probability of execution and the homicide rate; that is, the data fit Ehrlich's model so as to suggest,
although not at conventional levels of statistical reliability, that
higher likelihoods of executions are associated with higher homicide
rates. 103
One cannot fully understand the degree to which these :findings
destroy Ehrlich's conclusion without appreciating the strength of
Ehrlich's approach. Ehrlich's argument that executions deter homicide is, in the first instance, not empirical. It is a theoretical argument drawn from Ehrlich's understanding of the economic model of
human behavior. While one might reasonably have a very different
conception of forces that affect potential murderers, Ehrlich's conception is sufficiently congruent with one accepted view of "economic man" that it should be taken seriously. Ehrlich uses empirical
evidence to test the soundness of a theory. The fact that his theory,
carefully specified in advance, is confirmed by his data gives us further confidence in the soundness of that theory. It is from that theory that we draw the conclusion that executions save lives. The
empirical results serve only to confirm the theory and to supply us
with an estimate of the trade-off.
However, nothing about the theory of economic man suggests
that people ought to respond to incentives one way during the period
1933-1962 or 1935-1964, and another way during the period 19331969 or 1941-1969. 104 Thus, the sensitivity of Ehrlich's results to
time destroys the theoretical underpinnings of his approach. Unless
a theory can be offered that accommodates the temporal sensitivity
103. Passell & Taylor, supra note 87, at 362-63.
104. Ehrlich's response to his critics on this point is that truncating the data at 1962 or 1964
is statistically unsound because it sacrifices degrees of freedom needed to subject the theory to
a fair test. See Ehrlich, supra note 92, at 214-17; Ehrlich & Randall, supra note 66, at 297.
However, in his original article, Ehrlich presents several truncations at the other end of his
time series, including one at 1941 which costs more degrees of freedom than the 1964 truncations and still yields statistically significant results.

.Desert and .Deterrence

May 1981]

1213

of the data, Ehrlich's results are a statistical curiosity. There is no
way to explain them.
To transform Ehrlich's results from evidence that executions deter to evidence consistent with the opposite conclusion, one must
show that Ehrlich's model is more adequately specified for the period 1933-1964 than for the longer time frame. This is the case if
there are factors not measured by Ehrlich's variables which might
have had an important influence on the homicide rate in the 1960s
but are not likely to have affected homicide rates at an earlier time.
Possibilities noted in the literature include racial tension, the
proliferation of handguns, the Viet Nam War, the political assassinations of the sixties and the disjunction between real achievement and
rising expectations. Of these, the proliferation of handguns may be
most important. Zimring has shown that in violent attacks guns are
substantially more lethal than other likely alternatives, 105 and there
was a marked upsurge in the purchase of guns for nonsporting purposes in the 1960s. Kleck has recently estimated a model designed to
explain homicides during the period 1947-1973. He finds that the
level of gun ownership is an important explanatory variable, while
different measures of execution risk are statistically insignificant and
often have perversely positive coefficients (j.e., coefficients that suggest the more a state executes the higher its homicide rate). 106
3.

The Sharp Prediction

Another way of evaluating Ehrlich's results is to treat them not as
the test of a hypothesis but as a statement of one. That hypothesis is
Ehrlich's "sharp prediction" concerning the elasticity of the murder
rate with respect to the conditional probability of executions. Evaluating that elasticity at the average rates of murders and executions
over the period 1935-1969 yields Ehrlich's much publicized conclusion that each execution might have saved- eight lives. We can ask
whether the data relating executions to homicide rates is consistent
with this conclusion. Bailey has asked that question with respect to
California, 107 North Carolina, 108 Oregon, 109 and Utah. 110 His gen105. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721
(1968).
106. Kleck, Capital Punishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J. Soc. 882 (1979).
107. Bailey, The Deterrent E.ffec( ofthe Death Penaltyfar Murder in Calffomia, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 743 (1979).
108. Bailey, An Analysis of the Deterrent Effect ofthe Death Penalty in North Carolina, 10
N.C. CENT. L.J. 29 (1978).
109. Bailey, Deterrence and the Death Penalty far Murder in Oregon, 16 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 67 (1979).
110. Bailey, Detellence and the Death Penaltyfar Murder in Utah: A Time Series Analysis,
5 J. CONTEMP. L. l (1978).
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eral approach is to use multiple regression analysis to measure the
effect of executions on homicide rates within states beginning about
1910 or 1920 and ending about 1960, 111 controlling for changes in
each state's nonwhite population, male population, unemployment
rate, urban population, and population between twenty and fortynine years old. Bailey measures homicide rates in two ways, explores the effects of lagged execution rates, and reports results for
both ordinary and two-stage least squares. Whatever the particular
method and measures, the results in each state are similar. Whether
executions have a positive effect on the homicide rate (as they sometimes do) or their predicted negative effect, the effect is always small
and statistically insignificant. Executions are invariably less important in predicting homicide rates than most or all of the control variables. Ehrlich's prediction receives no support from these data.
I have tried a conceptually simpler approach to testing Ehrlich's
conclusion as an hypothesis. 112 It begins with the observation that in
Sellin's contiguous states fluctuations in homicide rates over time
tend to be similar. Thus, whatever the initially important differences
in factors that predict to homicide, changes in adjacent states from
year to year tend not to be dramatically different. If one execution
saves eight lives, one would expect differences in annual homicide
rates to reflect yearly differences in executions. The advantage of the
more persistently executing state should increase with each additional execution. Indeed, assuming that Ehrlich is correct, one may
calculate the expected effect of executions on homicide rates by multiplying the difference in the number of executions times eight and
dividing by the population in 100,000s of the more persistently executing state. Thus, if a state of four million people executes five
111. Because Bailey needs information available only for census years to control for certain factors, he treats homicide rates as dependent only during census years and the two years
preceding and following. The assumption is that state demographic characteristics do not
change so rapidly that there is substantial error introduced by assuming that decile data is
characteristic of the two years before and after.
·
Bailey changes his measure of homicide rates from Vital Statistics to FBI data for years
after 1933 when the latter became available because he believes that the FBI data more closel_y
approximate the rate of murders punishable by death. He may be right, but this switch 1s
nonetheless unfortunate since the different biases of the two data sets can affect the results.
The degree to which the results may be affected and the direction of any effects cannot be
estimated from the information Bailey presents.
I 12. Lempert, The .Deterrent Effect of the .Death Penalty: A New Look in an Old Light
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Law Review). This paper provides not only
the results of this research, but also a detailed discussion of the rationale behind my approach
and of the various assumptions, regarding such things as lag times and appropriate comparison
periods, that guided the analysis of the data.
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murderers in a given year, Ehrlich's results lead one to expect that
the state's homicide rate for that year will be one per 100,000 less
than it would have been had the state executed no one. The state's
homicide rate should compare more favorably with the rate of an
abolitionist neighbor than it does in years when the state executes
fewer people.
This procedure has several advantages over Sellin's procedure,
and two of them respond to Ehrlich's criticisms. It not only promises
better control on other relevant variables (since each state is to some
extent its own control), but it also allows comparisons between death
penalty states and speaks to the issue of whether executions deter.
Applying this approach to states examined by Sellin yields results
quite inconsistent with Ehrlich's prediction. Overall there is no evidence that states do better than their neighbors in discouraging
homicide in years when they are relatively more prone to execute.
Almost all results are statistically insignificant, and about as many
run counter to deterrence theory as support it. Of those results in the
predicted direction, fewer than half suggest that a single execution
saves as many as four lives.
In sum, the results that Ehrlich presents in his well-known article
deserve no place in the debate on capital punishment. The research
is flawed conceptually and methodologically, and conclusions that
have been drawn from the study are not supported by either the state
level data examined by Baily and me or, using Ehrlich's preferred
techniques, by national data when different time periods are examined or when other plausible variables, like levels of gun ownership, are included in the regression equations.
4.

Other Econometric Approaches

Ehrlich's work is the precursor of numerous studies using multiple regression analysis and, in some cases, simultaneous equation
models. 113 Most of these studies find no evidence that executions
deter. The two best conceived studies, those of Forst and Knorr, use
113. A simultaneous equation model takes into account the reciprocal influences that may
exist between variables. Thus the homicide rate is influenced by the execution rate if death
sentences deter murder. However, the execution rate is influenced by the homicide rate if
executions are most likely when murder rates are high. A model that controls for simultaneous
relationships requires more than one equation and may be contrasted with a single equation
model Because the reciprocal interaction between homicides and execution appears reasonable if executions deter, simultaneous equation models are likely to test the deterrence hypothesis more adequately than single equation models. However, special problems that arise in
testing simultaneous equation models may limit their utility. See Fisher & Nagin, On the
Feasibility ofIdentifying the Crime Function in a Simultaneous Model of Crime Rates and Sanction Levels, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 361.
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temporal cross-sectional models. 114 Neither Forst, who examines the
years 1960 and 1970, nor Knorr, who looks at 1950 and 1960, finds
evidence that executions deter. However, both studies have drawbacks that make them oflimited relevance to the policy debate. The
major drawback to Forst's study is his choice of years. By 1960, executions were already so infrequent that the subsequent decrease to
zero may not be a fair measure of the deterrent efficacy of an active
system (even by historical standards) of capital punishment. Knorr's
study suffers because the unavailability of state data forces him to
measure certain important effects at the national level. Holding
these variables constant across states and regions undermines the
strongest feature of his approach.
There have been a number of recent examinations of the time
series data that explore different time periods, use different functional forms, and control for different variables. Among the studies
that fail to find a significant deterrent effect of executions are those
by Bailey, 115 Bechdolt, 116 K.leck, 117 McKee and Sesnowitz, 118 Passell
and Taylor, 119 and Shin. 120 Probably the most provocative of the
recent times series analyses is a study by Bowers and Pierce exploring the impact of executions on homicides in the state of New York
between the years 1906 and 1963.1 21 Looking at the relationship between executions and homicides in the months following executions,
they estimate that each execution leads to two or three homicides
that would not otherwise have occurred. This brutalizing effect is
strongest during the first month after an execution and has largely
dissipated by the end of the next month. The authors also point out
that a number of the econometric analyses, 122 as well as the less techI 14. See Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the
1960's, 61 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977); Knorr, .Deterrence and the .Death Penalty: A Temporal
Cross-Sectional Approach, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 235 (1979).
Cross-sectional research on the death penalty typically takes a cross-section of some or all
of the fifty states and examines differences among them. Temporal or time series research
examines relationships in a single jurisdiction as they change over time. The studies by Forst
and Knorr combine these approaches.
llS. See articles cited in notes 107-I0mpra.
I 16. Bechdolt, Capital Punishment and Homicide and Rape Rates in the United State: Time
Series and Cross Sectional Regression Analyses, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 33 (1977).
ll7. Kleck, mpra note 106.
I 18. McKee & Sesnowitz, mpra note 80 (Canadian data).
ll9. Passell & Taylor, mpra note 87.
120. K. SHIN, DEATH PENALTY AND CRIME (1978).
121. Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: Whal is the Effect of Execution?, 26
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 453 (1980).
122. Bowers and Pierce cite the work of Kleck, supra note I06, Klein, mpra note 77, Bailey, mpra notes 107-110, and Passell, The Detellent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical
Test, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, mpra note 5, at 398. A number of
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nical work of Dann, 123 Savitz, 124 Graves, 125 and King, 126 are consistent with their results in that these studies, even if not producing
statistically significant results, tend to show a positive association between executions and homicides.
This study by Bowers and Pierce is an admirable first step in the
search for the possible brutalization effects of executions, but it is
obviously not the last word. It is limited by its focus on one state and
by the limits that monthly data place on the ability to control for
other factors.1 27 Also, in view of Phillips's :findings,1 28 one wishes
that Bowers and Pierce had looked at homicides in the execution
month. If Phillips :findings generalize, one would expect that homicide rates during execution months would diminish substantially
enough to offset later brutalization effects. 129
Apart from Ehrlich's work, the only two time series analyses suggesting deterrence that I found in my search of the literature are by
Yunker 130 and Wolpin.13 1 Yunker's study is so idiosyncratic in its
methodology that it could be dismissed out of hand even if his results did not imply the untenable conclusion that each execution prevents 156 murders.13 2 Wolpin, working with the British data,
estimates that each execution prevents four homicides. Unfortunately, Wolpin's results are presented in summary fashion, so it is
difficult to evaluate the study. Wolpin acknowledges that there are
difficult methodological issues to be resolved and speaks of "imporother studies in this genre, e.g., K. SHIN, supra note 120, are also generally consistent with their
observation.
123. R. DANN, supra note 58.
124. Savitz, supra note 59.
125. Graves, supra note 61.
126. King, supra note 73.
127. Bowers and Pierce are able to control for general time trends, seasonality, and World
War II and they adjust their data to correct for autocorrelated error.
128. Phillips, supra note 78.
129. If an execution occurred at the very end of a month or at the very beginning, Phillips's
results would lead one to expect little or no brutalizing effect in the month following the executions. Thus, by examining months that do not fit the general pattern of brutalization and by
noting the dates of executions in preceding months, Bowers and Pierce have an easy if crude
check on the generalizeability of Phillips's findings.
130. Yunker, Is the .Death Penalty a .Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time Series Evidence, 5
J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 45 (1976).
131. Wolpin, Capital Punishment and Homoclde in England: A Summary ofResults, 90 AM.
ECON. A. PAPERS &PRoc.422, (1978).
132. Yunker identifies the deterrence function using only 1960 data and controls only for
the unemployment rate in his analysis. For criticisms of Yunker, see Fox, The Ident!ftcation
and Estimation of.Deterrence: An Evaluation of Yunker's Model, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 225
(1977); Sensowitz & McKee, On the .Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL
EcoN. 217 (1977). See Yunker, An Old Controversy Renewed, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 1
(1977), for an indication that the author no longer has complete ~aith in his results.
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tant limitations of the data." 133 Polinsky, in a brief comment on
W olpin, mentions two such limitations:· Wolpin does not control for
the possibility that the average time served for homicide might have
decreased as execution rates diminished, and Wolpin's model does
not consider the immigration of different racial groups which may
have accounted for the rapid increase in the English homicide rate
after 1961.134
In addition to the studies by Forst and Knorr mentioned above,
cross-sectional research by Bechdolt, 135 Black and Orsagh, 136 Boyles
and McPheters, 137 Passell, 138 and Shin 139 fails to reveal a deterrent
effect. Studies by Cloninger 140 and Ehrlich 141 find a deterrent effect
with cross-sectional data. Cloninger, using a single equation model,
finds that the execution rate over the years 1955-1959 has a significant negative effect on homicides in thirty-two non-Southern - but
not in sixteen Southern - states during 1960. As with Yunker,
Cloninger's results may be rejected simply because of the implausibility of the conclusions that follow from them. For example, Cloninger's results imply that the number of homicide deaths in Ohio in
1960 would have been reduced from 311 to less than forty if only one
more murderer had been executed during the years 1955-1959.
Among the flaws in Cloninger's model are his failure to include information on sentence length and an execution variable based on
five-year averages which, because of the decline in the number of
executions in the late fifties, makes state penal action in 1955 more
important in determining differences in 1960 homicide rates than
state penal action in 1959.
Ehrlich's 1977 paper is sounder in its approach to the problem
133. Wolpin, supra note 131, at 422-23.
134. Polinsky, Economics and Law, Discussion, 90 AM. ECON. A. PAPERS & PROC. 435
(1978).
135. Bechdolt, supra note 116.
136. Black & Orsagh, supra note 87.
137. Boyles & McPheters, Capital Punishment as a Deterrent to Violent Crime: Cross Sec•
tional Evidence, 5 J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 67 (1977).
138. Passell, supra note 122.
139. K. SHIN, supra note 120.
Shin looks not only at the states in cross-section, but he also looks at a cross-section of 20
countries. In this cross-section Shin finds the presence of capital punishment is significantly
associated with higher homicide rates. However, these results might be substantially different
if a different subset of countries had been examined or if additional controls, such as measures
of police efficiency, had been available. Shin was only able to control for the_ inflation rate,
percent urban population, degree of industrialization, the growth rate of the GNP, actual
GNP, the unemployment rate, and the presence or absence of the death penalty.
140. Cloninger, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Cross Sectional Analysis, 6 J. BEHAvIORAL ECON. 87 (1977).
141. Ehrlich, supra note 83, at 741.
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than his 1975 longitudinal study, but it has received much less attention. There has been no replication of this work, so it is difficult to
determine how sensitive the analysis is to Ehrlich's choice of variables and functional form. Ehrlich candidly acknowledges a variety
of problems with the data and the model. Taken together, the various deficiencies mean that although we can admire Ehrlich's effort,
he has again produced a piece that deserves little weight in the debate on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Some of the problems with the study are familiar. The deterrent
effect of convictions is considerably stronger than the effect of executions given convictions, so that if there is a sufficient trade-off between the two we would not expect executions to deter even if
Ehrlich's results are correct. Also, Ehrlich is not able to measure the
length of imprisonment among those eligible for execution but not
executed, so he is again addressing the wrong question. 142 Most importantly, the results do not unequivocally indicate that executions
deter, and the coefficients of most control variables in the equations
that do so indicate have surprising values, which suggest that the
models are seriously misspecified.
In Ehrlich's full sample of states, his execution variable is consistently and significantly negative in its effect on homicide rates only
when a dummy variable is used that distinguishes executing from
nonexecuting states. The dummy indicates that executing states
have significantly higher homicide rates than those that do not execute. Ehrlich suggests that this indicates the full model was misspecified. His preferred explanation is that, in assigning an
arbitrarily low value of execution risk to nonexecuting states to allow
logarithmic transformations of the execution risk variable, he understates the subjective risk of execution in those states. 143 While this
142. He does have a measure of median time spent in state prisons by murderers prior to
first release, but the variable provides little or no information about the crucial .question:
namely whether the deterrent effects of executed death sentences exceed that of sentences to
life imprisonment. Medians are particularly inappropriate to this kind of evaluation. They
are typically used where extreme scores make the mean a distorted measure of central tendency. When we are interested in the relative efficacy of death sentences and life terms, we are
interested only in the extreme prison terms. While Ehrlich doesn't say what crimes his murder
category includes, it is likely that it includes, and it is probably dominated by, noncapital
homicides. Furthermore, those sentenced to life and never released would not affect any measure based on time served before release from prison, while those released after many years
(perhaps because life terms have been commuted) will reflect the sentencing patterns of years
gone by. Yet Ehrlich's release data is only available for 1951. This is used in equations for
both 1940 and 1950.
143. One cannot take a log of zero. Thus Ehrlich's model cannot, strictly speaking, be
tested if it purports to include states with no executions and incorporates the log of the execution risk variable. To test his model, Ehrlich follows common practice and replaces zero scores
with arbitrarily low figures to allow the logarithmic transformations. This may be reasonable
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may be true of nonexecuting death penalty states, it seems implausible when applied to the abolitionist states which form the bulk of the
states with no executions in the years examined. 144 Ehrlich's other
explanation, that there are missing variables that differ significantly
across executing and nonexecuting states, is an admission that the
model is inadequate.
Misspecification is also suggested by a number of Ehrlich's results which, although explained after the fact, do not point in the
direction that one would intuitively expect. Generally speaking,
Ehrlich finds that unemployment and labor force participation rates
are not significantly· associated with homicide rates in either 1940 or
1950, and the percentage of families with incomes below one half of
the median income shows no significant association with homicides
in 1940. 145 The percentage of families in urban areas is negatively
associated with homicide rates 146 while the proportion of the population between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is negatively related
to homicides in 1940 and not significantly related in 1950. Finally,
states with higher median incomes tend to have higher homicide
rates in both years; The only control variable that is consistently
significant in what is indisputably the expected direction is the percentage of nonwhites in the population. 147 Although the deterrence
variables are all in the predicted direction, a model which yields
counterintuitive results on a number of theoretically important variin death penalty states that have not executed in the years examined, since the fact that a state
has a law providing for the death penalty may well mean that its citizens perceive some risk of
execution for murder even though no one has been executed in the years examined or in the
several preceding years.
144. Where nonexecuting death penalty states are included, they have not executed for
four or five years prior to the year examined, suggesting that the perceived risk of execution in
these states would be quite low relative to the perceived risk in states that have executed.
145. Ehrlich notes measurement problems with this variable and the median income variable for the year 1940. See Ehrlich, supra note 83, at 754 n.13.
146. Since Ehrlich uses urban homicide rates as the dependent variable in most of his
equations, he argues that percent urban population does not have its intuitive meaning but is a
correcting factor. However, the relationship is the same for 1940 and insignificant for 1950
when he replicates his results with state-wide homicide rates based on Vital Statistics data. My
hunch is that this relationship exists because Ehrlich, unlike many who work with cross-sectional data, does not include a dummy variable in his model to capture factors unique to the
South. The South was likely to have been relatively rural during the periods examined but to
have had high homicide rates in its urban areas.
Ehrlich presents data by region pooled across the two time periods and indicates that the
hypothesis of identical coefficients for Northern and Southern states cannot be rejected at the
.05 level of significance. His choice of significance level is conventional, but the convention
makes little sense when the null hypothesis is the favored one. One wants to know what the
exact significance level is and one would like to know this for each period rather than for the
pooled set.
147. This summary is based on Ehrlich's results for the subset of executing states. Results
are generally similar in the full set.
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ables cannot be trusted with respect to results that are as predicted.148 Ehrlich's results are also suspect because the predicted
trade-off of one execution for twenty to twenty-four lives is substantially less consistent with the findings of other researchers than are
his 1975 results.149
Reading the econometric studies, including many that find no evidence that executions deter, I am reminded of the story of the drunk
who lost his keys one dark night. Although he thought he had lost
his keys in the middle of the block, he looked for them at the comer
because the light was better. If we assume a sufficiently black night,
the drunk was not acting foolishly, for he certainly could not have
found his keys in the dark. However, when he had good reason to
believe the keys were elsewhere, he was unlikely to find them under
the light. The econometricians who have searched for a deterrent
effect of executions are a bit like that drunk. Their techniques require substantial light in the form of reliable data which is not only
consistently associated with underlying concepts but is also available
over time and across jurisdictions. The search for deterrence often is
guided, quite understandably, by the availability of decent data
rather than by those theoretical considerations which suggest fruitful
places to look. Thus, cross-sectional research in the econometric tradition often seeks to explain 1960 homicide rates even though execution rates had by then diminished so substantially that historically
important deterrent effects might well have disappeared. This preference for a weak test of the deterrence hypothesis is explained by
the fact that statewide census data for 1960 is richer than the data
available for preceding census years.
Longitudinal studies, on the other hand, tend to rely on national
data even though theory suggests that it is state execution policies
which are crucial, and we know that many states differ substantially
from national norms. The specification of national models does not
reflect a perverse preference for less powerful tests; it is all one can
do when crucial state data are unavailable over time. Where the
econometric modeling is more closely responsive to theory, as with
Ehrlich 150 or Knorr, 151 the quality of the available data may pre148. For reasons I give in my effort to establish a common sense theoretical position, I also
find Ehrlich's prediction of a deterrent effect to capital punishment intuitively implausible.
Note that the kinds of demographic variables that are insignificant in Ehrlich's analysis or,
arguably, away from the predicted direction, are usually more important in explaining homicide rates than the deterrence variables. See, e.g., Bailey, supra notes 107-10.
149. While I reject Ehrlich's results, I have more admiration for this effort than for his
earlier work. He is sensitive to many of the problems that inhere in the available data and in
the analyses they allow.
150. Ehrlich, supra note 83, at 741.
151. Knorr, supra n~te 114.
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elude preferred techniques of model building and may lead to results
that are suspect or even meaningless. 152
I do not want to overstate this point. Where an econometric
study appears generally sound, its results should not be quickly dismissed because of inevitable questions about theoretical choices or
data quality. If the econometric studies generally revealed a deterrent effect associated with executions, this finding would have to be
taken seriously. As it is, the body of econometric research overwhelmingly favors the conclusion that executions do not deter. This
evidence, together with the simpler but more revealing work of Sellin and others and our initial theoretical perspective, is sufficient to
justify the conclusion that capital punishment, as administered historically in the United States, does not prevent more homicides than
it may cause. Do we have absolute proof that capital punishment, as
historically administered, does not save lives? No; we can never
have such proof. But when we look at all the evidence, we find proof
to a moral certainty.
"Proof to a moral certainty" - as a social scientist I am uncomfortable in writing such words. Let me offer an example that conveys
my meaning more precisely. Imagine a group of people living on the
shores of a great lake who were convinced that their crops would be
destroyed by a monster living in the lake unless each year one of
their number were sacrificed to the monster. While they were civilized enough to believe that killing was generally immoral, in this
instance they thought the sacrifice justified by the harm it avoided.
For years the sacrifices continued in the belief that they were
needed to save large numbers from starvation. But at some point, as
views about the causes of crop failure changed, a few people suggested that perhaps there was no monster in the lake and the sacrificial killings served no purpose. Immediately the lake was dragged,
albeit with a large mesh net. No monster was found, but the sacrifices went on. The mesh was too large to guarantee that there was no
monster in the lake, and the risk that an existing monster had not
been discovered was too great given the great harm that such a monster might do. Over the years other techniques were used to spot the
monster. Sonar revealed nothing, nets with smaller and smaller
152. For other difficulties with these approaches, see Brier & Feinberg, Recent Econometric
of Crime and Punishment: Support far the .Deterrence Hypothesis?, 4 EVALUATION
REv. 147 (1980); Fisher & Nagin, supra note 113; Gibbs, A Critique oftl1e Literature on Capital
Punishment and .Deterrence, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 279 (1977); Glaser, The Realities ofHomicide Versus Assumptions of Economists in Assessing Capital Punishment, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL
ECON. 243 (1977).
Modeling
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mesh turned up nothing, divers saw nothing. Occasionally someone
would report spotting the monster, but upon investigation these reports always proved unreliable. Eventually a point was reached
where the lake had been searched with reasonable care. Was it certain the monster was not there? No; there might be an unknown
cave along the lake bottom that had not been searched, or the monster might have been so much smaller than people thought that it
would not be recognized if seen, or it might be so small as to be
undiscoverable by the techniques used. (Of course, the smaller the
monster the less crops it would eat and the less people would suffer if
the sacrifices stopped.) Still the sacrifices continued. People who
had been raised on the myth (if it was a myth) of the monster and
who had not closely followed the fruitless searches continued to believe the sacrifices necessary, particularly if they thought those sacrificed had little right to live anyway.
Yet, belief in the monster, however widespread, could not
breathe life into a creature that had never been real or had long since
died. Those concerned with the morality of the sacrifice came, some
more reluctantly than others, to realize that they could no longer in
good faith justify sacrificial deaths by the need to placate a cropeating monster. Despite the possibility that the searchers had missed
an actual monster, enough unsuccessful attempts had been made to
find the beast that the moral decision regarding the sacrifice had to
proceed on the assumption that the monster was a myth. As the community leaders realized, taking life could not be forever justified by
reference to a theory whose predictions continually failed to materialize. The failure to find traces of the monster must at some point be
dispositive in the moral debate - whatever the next search party
might find. Otherwise there could be no good faith debate.
This allegory captures what I mean when I write that, within the
limits of historical patterns of execution, the failure of the death penalty as a deterrent has been proved to a moral certainty. It may never
be possible for social scientists to be certain that the death penalty
does not deter homicide, 153 but there is now enough research that
fails to reveal deterrence that for purposes of moral argument one
must proceed as if the death penalty does not deter. 154 At some
153. If there is a substantial brutalization effect to the death penalty it might be possible to
say that if the death penalty deters, its deterrent effects are outweighed by its tendencies to
encourage killing.
154. For two papers that might be read as implying that this judgment may overstate the
evidence, see Barnett, The .Detellent Effect of Capital Punishment: Yet Another Study, and
Barnett, The .Detellent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Test of Some Recent Studies (unpublished papers on file with the Michigan Law Review). The core of Barnett's argument is that
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point possibilities become so mere that they cannot serve as a moral
basis for action. 155 This does not mean that research on capital punishment and deterrence should stop, nor can it guarantee that matters will always seem this way.
CONCLUSION

I have written at great length. Let me conclude briefly. Morally,
there are two permissible bases for capital punishment - retribution
and deterrence. Retribution, despite an honest appeal to human
emotion, cannot justify a system of state executions inevitably
tainted by mistake, bias, and caprice. Deterrence can justify capital
punishment if systems of capital punishment save lives. There is little reason to believe that the availability of capital punishment is except possibly in certain rare circumstances - a substantial marginal deterrent. The empirical evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary and is sufficiently strong and one-sided that we should
executions have been so infrequent with respect to homicides and other influences on homicide
rates are so important that one could not expect the econometric research to reveal deterrent
effects of any likely magnitude. In terms of my allegory, it is as if all search parties were using
nets whose mesh was larger than the monster they expected to find. "I think Barnett's papers
are well worth reading, but I am not at this point sufficiently persuaded to change my judgment on this matter. Barnett explicitly analyzes only three cross-sectional econometric studies.
He does not consider time series research or approaches other than regression analysis. Also,
from his perspective, which is shared by the econometricians he criticizes, it is the number of
executions that makes the difference. His argument would not follow if the first execution
were particularly important or if the presence of the death penalty made a substantial difference. Such effects, if they existed, might well be expected to be revealed in the data. For a
judgment of the capacity of standard econometric approaches to shed light on the deterrent
effects of capital punishment that is similar to Barnett's but based on different considerations,
see Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 77.
In reaching my judgment about the proper import of the evidence of deterrence for the
moral debate, I am considering the role that arguments from deterrence should have on the
issue of whether capital punishment is justified for first-degree murder generally or for some
general subset (e.g., particularly heinous) of first-degree murders. I do not believe there is
enough evidence or a sufficient theoretical basis to preclude, in the moral sense I describe in
the text, the argument that the death penalty is likely to deter rather specific subsets of murders
such as those committed by people serving life sentences. What little evidence we have about
such situations does not suggest deterrence but is too insubstantial to outweigh the plausible
theoretical case that supporters of capital punishment may offer.
155. This, of course, does not preclude other moral bases for capital punishment such as
retribution, but, as we have seen in Part I, the retributivist argument cannot justify a system for
inflicting death that is biased or error prone. One might argue that if most of those executed
deserve death one can make a moral case for the death penalty from deterrence even if the
evidence suggesting deterrence is slight. I do not believe this is so. Slight evidence of deterrence is not the same as evidence of slight deterrence. The latter might justify the execution of
some innocent people if this were necessary to secure the execution of many more guilty persons and if the cumulative effect of all executions were great. The former does not allow
execution because it provides little reason to believe that any executions do any good. Even if
there were evidence of slight deterrence, retributivism would not allow the moral case for
capital punishment to be based on such evidence if achieving that slight deterrence meant the
mistaken sacrifice of innocent or not sufficiently culpable people.
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approach the question of the morality of the death penalty with the
assumption that capital punishment does not deter. Putting the two
arguments together, we must conclude that, however great its intuitive appeal, the renewed effort to punish by death cannot withstand
moral scrutiny. 156
APPENDIX

In this appendix I would like to pursue the question of whether current
retributivist justifications for the death penalty allow a system in which innocent people will, on occasion, be found guilty and because of that mistake, be executed. At the outset, I want to make clear that I shall not be
arguing that one could not construct a philosophy that values justice above
innocent lives and concomitantly, allows "mistaken" executions. I shall argue that the modem retributivists have not done so and that such a position
is inconsistent with certain positions they do or would take as well as with
some of the bases of their argument for the death penalty.
The opponent of capital punishment must admit that logic does not prevent people from valuing incremental justice above innocent life, and that
we may be comfortable in doing so if a substantial increment in justice may
be achieved at the cost of a few lives. For example, even if deterrence were
not a consideration, we might think it appropriate for police to risk their
lives in efforts to apprehend fleeing felons. However, when the death penalty is at issue, a special problem emerges which makes it difficult for retributivists to argue by analogy from this and similar examples.
The retributivist must show that for the special case of murder or for a
special subset of murders, death is a more just sanction than life imprisonment. In the retributivist literature this showing is typically made by reference to the awesomeness of the crime - that is, to the evil of intentionally
taking an innocent life - and to the intuition that in a just world such a
crime demands the ultimate punishment. However, if the system which imposes the ultimate punishment cannot proceed without inevitably replicating the momentous harm - the slaying of the innocent - that justifies
such punishment, the basis for- ~e system is µndermined.
Murder is a heinous crime in large measure because the harm to the
victim cannot be undone or otherwise fully compensated. Whether we punish capitally or with life imprisonment, murder victims will not be resuscitated nor, putting aside the possible preventive effects of punishment, will
other lives be saved. However, the decision not to allow capital punishment
will save the lives of those innocent people and those less than fully culpa156. The reader will note that while I am bold in assessing the morality of systems of
capital punishment I nowhere discuss their constitutionality. Those who believe that the Constitution does not permit states to administer severe punishment without a sound moral basis
will have little difficulty in drawing lessons for the Court from my argument. I, however, am
not certain about the implications ofmy conclusions for the constitutional debate, for I am not
convinced that the eighth amendment forbids all punishments that cannot withstand moral
scrutiny or allows all punishments that can. Thus, the relevance of this paper for the Court
depends not only on the soundness of the arguments advanced, but also on the developing
jurisprudence of the eighth amendment.
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ble killers who would have been mistakenly executed. Thus, the unique
value of innocent life, which is used to derive a conception of justice that
occasionally requires capital punishment, also argues against a system that
allows such punishment; if a state punishes capitally it will inevitably commit the terrible act necessary, in the retributivist scheme, to justify the killing of man. Furthermore, while state action cannot undo the harm caused
by a murderer, the state is able, by rejecting capital punishment, to prevent
additional harm which a retributivist would deplore.
The above conclusions point to an anomaly in the moral case for capital
punishment, but not, as I have noted earlier, to a logical inconsistency. One
might construct a justification for capital punishment that allows the state
to shed innocent blood if the incremental justice of shedding guilty blood
were thought to be worth it. But such a case would not have the appeal of
most current arguments for the death penalty, and hence it is rarely made.
Among its other difficulties, such a case would require supporters of capital
punishment to admit that they were willing to sacrifice some number of
innocent lives to the end of promoting what they see as justice. This would
conflict with the claim often found in the retributivist literature that a punishment system should respect human life as an end value and not treat it
- even in the case of the culpable - as a means to some greater good.
Retributivists will argue that the above discussion is vulnerable at least
insofar as it assumes that inadvertent mistakes in the application of the
death penalty are in some sense the moral equivalent of murder. For the
retributivist this equation is misguided because a crucial element of the
crime of murder - indeed the element that justifies the death penalty - is
that the killing is intentional. Since the state does not intend to kill the
innocent but strives mightily (albeit withou_t complete success) to ensure
that this will not occur, the state cannot be held morally responsible for the
death of the innocent in the way that a murderer can.
This is an appealing argument, and I concede that it may be sound at
the level of individual sentencing. A jury sentencing a man to death may
not, if it has found the facts competently and in good faith, be held morally
accountable for the wrong of condemning an innocent person. But the
moralist who advocates a system of capital punishment is not in the same
position as the juror who mistakenly condemns. Unless the moralist is ignorant of the history of capital punishment and of the fallibility of human
beings, he knows that if the death penalty exists such mistakes are inevitable. If he intends to have a system of capital punishment, he intends to
take innocent lives whether or not he wants to. Intentions are not defined
by desires.
The fact that the moralist does not know which of the executed will be
innocent may be important at a sociological or psychological level - those
who participate in or observe executions may be comfortable in their ignorance - but it offers little at the level of principle. If the retributivist's
principles do not allow the intentional taking of the innocent life as a means
to greater justice - and for most moral retributivists they do not - they
will not justify a system that makes such takings inevitable. Those who
think that modem retributivist philosophies allow this confuse the comforts
of ignorance with justification in principle. Statistical thinking is not only
thoughtful, it is, in its own way, precise. For modem man, treating the
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statistically predictable as other than inevitable is a form of false consciousness. The difference between the juror and the moralist is that even if the
juror is mistaken he cannot be accused of bad faith when he claims that the
person he has condemned is guilty; the moralist, on the other hand, cannot
honestly say that the system he advocates kills only the guilty. In other
words, the system advocate is responsible for knowing the parameters of
punishment systems in a way that a juror - who is charged with evaluating
just one person - is not.
Perhaps it is belaboring what is obvious to some and obviously wrong to
others, but I think it helpful to elucidate the above points with a series of
examples. First, consider a situation which will be judged similarly by most
participants in the debate. Assume a society in which, according to the tenets of retributivism, ninety-eight people deserve to die. Unfortunately the
populace is not accustomed to executions and will not punish the convicted
by more than life imprisonment. However, if two innocent but unpopular
members of the community were killed first, it would overcome the public's
aversion to blood, and justice would be done in the other ninety-eight cases.
Are we acting morally ifwe execute the two innocent people? Most retributivists would answer "no." We cannot take the lives of innocent persons to
facilitate greater punishment and hence greater justice among a group of
people who will be severely punished regardless.
(Those who would allow innocent people to be executed in this hypothetical situation might wish to stop here, for what follows assumes agreement on this example. If a case for executing known innocents exists in the
modem literature espousing retribution, I have not found it.)
Does the moral situation change if we do not know which innocents we
are killing? Suppose for example all one hundred prisoners are in a courtyard and after being told that ninety-eight deserve to die but two are innocent we are asked whether we would shoot all one hundred. I assume the
answer will again be "no," for I can see no principled moral distinction
between this situation and the situation where the two innocents are set
before us to be shot first. In both situations we tolerate the killing of innocents in order to more justly - by our retributivist principles - treat the
guilty. In each case we do not want to kill the innocent, but everyone we
kill we kill intentionally and in each case we intend a system designed (albeit in small measure) to take innocent life. The fact that we did not want
to design such a system does not mean we can close our eyes to what we
have built.
Nor is the moral situation changed by our taking steps that might prevent the killing of the innocent so long as we know our steps will not be
very effective. Suppose, for example, that two of our hundred prisoners
were to be chosen at random to be freed and the rest executed. The hope
would be that the two innocent prisoners would be freed and the ninetyeight guilty executed, and it is indeed possible that this would happen. But
this happy coincidence would be unlikely in any given group, and its continual repetition would be virtually impossible if we executed enough
groups of one hundred. Again, it is difficult to distinguish this situation
from our first case. In neither one do we want to kill innocent people, but
in both we have to if we are going to execute the guilty, and in both we
intend a system that will have this effect.
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Finally, we may try hard to develop a system that sorts the guilty from
the innocent. If the system selects people for execution without error or
with only lenient errors it would be morally permissible on retributivist
principles. Indeed, if intentionality is crucial, so long as we could believe in
good faith that our system worked without error it might be morally permissible to execute those it condemned. However, as evidence accumulated
that innocent men have been erroneously killed despite systemic precautions and as we developed insight into sources of human fallibility (e.g., the
vagueries of eyewitness identification) that made error inevitable, we would
find it increasingly difficult to distinguish the morality of this system from
our first universally condemned example. In each case we intentionally
construct a system that we know will necessarily execute the innocent however little we desire this result. We may be comforted by the fact that with
our new safeguards we are making fewer than two errors in a hundred, but
this should not amount to a moral difference. Modem retributivist philosophy does not suggest that our reaction to the situation originally hypothesized should be different if but one innocent person had to be executed to
pave the way for the execution of 999 people who deserved death.
In any system of capital punishment we do not know what the error
proportion is. I would be astonished if we executed people who did not
participate in killings as frequently as two percent of the time. However,
retributivism graduates penalties by blameworthiness, even when the offense is homicide. I would not be surprised if far more than two percent of
our executions involved people whose mental state at the time they killed
was not sufficiently culpable as to justify the death penalty by prevailing
retributivist standards. Our justice system probably does a lot better in
identifying killers than it does in measuring intentionality.
There is a doctrine of Catholic moral philosophy that might appear to
give comfort to those who wish to argue that the last of my examples
presents a system that as a moral matter is different in kind from the others
I describe. This is the so-called doctrine of double effect. This doctrine is
thought by some distinguished philosophers to be invalid. H.L.A. Hart, for
example, writes that the doctrine "is used to draw distinctions between
cases in a way ... puzzling to me and to many other secular moralists." 1
Commenting on specific cases distinguished by the doctrine, Hart concludes: ''There seems to be no relevant moral difference between them on
any theory of morality."2 Philippa Foot is more sympathetic but ultimately
critical as well.3 But the decision to reject the doctrine is not crucial to my
case. Even if it is accepted, it does not provide the moral basis needed to
distinguish my fourth example from my first.
The thrust of the doctrine of double effect is perhaps best understood by
example. To borrow one from Foot,4 suppose a man, A, is dying and can
only be saved by a dose of some rare drug. However, five other men, B, C,
.D, E, and F, are also dying and each can be saved by one fifth of a dose of
I. H. HART, Intention and Punishment, in
(1968).
2. Id at 124.
3. P. FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES (1978).
4. Id

PuNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY

113, 122

May 1981)

JJesert and .Deterrence

1229

that same drug. Ifwe give the drug toB, C,.D,E, andF, thus doomingA,
we would not be held accountable for a moral wrong. Indeed, even though
we knew A would die because of our choice, most would argue that we
were morally compelled to choose as we did. On the _other hand, suppose
the five could only be saved by killing a healthy man, G, and distilling a
serum from his blood. Again we have the opportunity to trade one life for
five, but most would agree that we would be acting immorally if we did so.
The doctrine of double effect explains our different moral reactions to
the two situations. In the first situation, the death of A was no part of our
plan to save the others; we simply knew it had to happen if we made the
choice. In Bentham's terminology A's death was an "oblique" rather than a
"direct" intention. In the second example, G's death was an essential part
of our plan to save the others. Had we killed him, albeit in a good cause, it
would have been with the direct intention of doing so.
The defender of capital punishment who wishes to rely on the doctrine
of double effect might similarly argue that in his preferred system there is
no desire to kill the innocent. Any "intention" to do so is only oblique and
not part of his design to achieve justice. However, there are at least two
reasons why the "double effect" argument does not morally justify a system
of capital punishment that inevitably kills innocent people even if it provides a satisfactory basis for other moral choices that necessarily doom the
innocent.
First, the double-effect doctrine is one of the last resort; it is typically
used to justify decisions where death or some equivalent horror is inescapable no matter what the choice. Thus, if in our example B, C, .D, E, and
F would not die if the drug were given to A, but would instead suffer pain
while awaiting the next shipment of the drug, the doctrine of.double effect
would not allow us to prefer alleviating the group's pain to saving A from
death. The choice of whether to allow the death penalty is like this last
example. If we allow it innocent people will certainly die, but if we don't
allow it, not only will we save the innocent, but our failure to execute those
who deserve to die does not mean that they go unpunished. Murderers are
punished severely if they are imprisoned for life. Thus, when the desirability of a system of capital punishment is at issue we are not confronted by
the dilemma that legitimates moral justification by reference to the doctrine
of double effect.
Second, as Philippa Foot nicely points out, the distinction between direct and oblique intention plays only a subsidiary role in explaining our
reaction to the difficult problems the double-effect doctrine appears to resolve. The distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is far more
crucial to our moral judgment.5 The former obligation is substantially
stronger than the latter. Thus, Foot postulates the situation of five people in
a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas
that unfortunately but inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom for some reason we are unable to move. That patient's
death is clearly an unintended side effect of the action we want to take and
in this sense it is similar to the situation of A, who will be denied a rare
S. Id at 29.
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drug. Yet, morally the decision to save the .five and doom A is far less
troubling than the decision to manufacture a gas that we know will kill a
bystander. In the one case we are failing to avert a tragedy that cannot be
averted except at the cost of greater grief. In the other case we are knowingly sacrificing (Foot says "using") a person for a system that can only
benefit others.
Systems of capital punishment are like Foot's case of the lethal gas. We
are knowingly using the lives of some innocent people (j.e., not avoiding
injury) to maintain a system that will allow the deaths of others who, in our
view, deserve that fate. True, the analogy would be more exact if we did
not know until after we manufactured the gas whether the poisoned room
was occupied, and it turned out that it often was not or did not appear to be.
However, once we had sufficient experience to know the room was sometimes inadvertently and unwillingly occupied and there was nothing we
could do about it, the moral quality of the decision to allow the gas to be
made is the same, except insofar as utilitarian considerations would lead us
to evaluate matters differently if the proportion of people saved to people
killed was greater. Thus, those circumstances that typically coincide with
intentionality and give the doctrine of double effect its intuitive appeal do
not upon close analysis strengthen the moral case of those who advocate the
death penalty in an imperfect world. It does not allow us to distinguish
morally between our original hypothetical in which two people were knowingly sacrificed to enable us to kill ninety-eight who deserved death and our
fourth hypothetical in which we knew for certain that innocent people
would be killed if we had the death penalty, but we did not desire their
deaths or know before the fact who they would be.
To say that there are no moral distinctions between these two cases is
not to say that there are no important distinctions. As individuals and as a
society we are clearly going to be more comfortable with the fourth situation than with the .first. In the one we are capable of deceiving ourselves
and in the other we are not. This difference has important implications.
For one thing, it will be easier to hire executioners and to secure participants at other stages of the condemnatory process if the innocent do not
stand out as such. For another, the claimed value of the innocent life is less
obviously contradicted in the fourth situation than in the .first, so society
might get away with treating each execution as an affirmation of the
supreme value of the innocent life rather than as an event that is only possible because innocent lives are not supreme.
However, these advantages of the fourth system over the .first are psychological and sociological. Unless we are willing to reduce morality to
what is sociologically and psychologically comfortable, they are not part of
a principled moral theory. In other settings the committed retributivist
would be the last to confuse what feels comfortable with what is right. We
need only consult the classic list of deadly sins to know that the comfortable
is often wrong. Retributivism cannot find refuge here. Indeed, if philosophical consistency is the test, most modem retributivists can find refuge
only in systems that assume away the imperfections of the world. As Walter Berns, a noted defender of the death penalty wrote:
Whether the United States, or any of them, should be permitted to carry
out executions is a question that is not answered simply by what I have
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written here [in the defense of the death penalty]. The answer depends on
our ability to restrict its use to the worst of our criminals and to impose it
in nondiscriminatory fashion. We do not yet know whether that can be
done.6
One must admire Berns for his frank recognition of reasons why the retributivist case for the death penalty, which he makes as eloquently as anyone, has no necessary moral implications for actual decisions on how to
punish murder. My only criticism is that we do know whether what he
thinks necessary can be done. The history of capital punishment, theories
of human fallibility, and our experience following Furman tell us that
Berns's conditions have never been met and give us no reason to suppose
they ever will be.

6. Berns, ./Jeftnding the ./Jeath Penalty, 26
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